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#### **T: PER SE**

#### Interpretations:

#### 1---“business practices” are ongoing conduct defined by the behaviors of many market participants

MacIntosh 97, Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A. 1978, Pomona College; J.D. 1982, Stanford University. (Kerry Lynn, “LIBERTY, TRADE, AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: WHEN SHOULD DEFAULT RULES BE BASED ON BUSINESS PRACTICES?” *William and Mary Law Review*, vol. 38, no. 4, May 1997, p. 1465-1544. HeinOnline, Accessed: 8-27-2021)

These new and revised articles reflect a strong trend toward choosing default rules4 that codify existing business practices.5 [[BEGIN FOOTNOTE 5]] 5. In this Article, the term "business practices" is used to refer to practices that emerge over time as countless market participants exercise their freedom to engage in profitable transactions. For an account of the evolution of business practices, see infra Part II. As used here, "business practices" is broader and less technical than "trade usage," which the Code narrowly defines as "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." U.C.C. § 1-205(2). [[END FOOTNOTE 5]] This is particularly true of the recent revisions to Articles 3 (Negotiable Instruments), 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections) and 5 (Letters of Credit).

**Only per se illegality forbids a practice---rules of reason prohibit anticompetitive effects for individual acts, not the practices themselves.**

Stevens 90, Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (John Paul, “FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n,” 493 U.S. 411, Lexis)

LEdHN[3C] [3C]LEdHN[14] [14]Equally important is the second error implicit in respondents' claim to immunity from the per se rules. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals assumed that the antitrust laws permit, but do not require, the condemnation of price fixing and boycotts without proof of market power. 15 The opinion further assumed that the per se rule prohibiting such activity "is only a rule of 'administrative convenience and efficiency,' not a statutory command." 272 U.S. App. D. C., at 295, 856 F. 2d, at 249.This statement contains two errors. HN10 [\*\*\*\*42] The per se [\*433] rules are, of course, the product of judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act, but the rules nevertheless have the same force and effect as any other statutory commands. Moreover, while the per se rule against price fixing and boycotts is indeed justified in part by "administrative convenience," the Court of Appeals erred in describing the prohibition as justified only by such concerns. The per se rules also reflect a long-standing judgment that the prohibited practices by their nature have "a substantial potential for impact on competition." Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984).

[\*\*\*\*43] LEdHN[15] [15]As we explained in Professional Engineers, HN11 the rule of reason in antitrust law generates

"two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality -- they are 'illegal per se.' In the second category are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed." 435 U.S., at 692.

[\*\*\*873] "Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable." Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).

[\*\*781] LEdHN[16] [16] [\*\*\*\*44] The per se rules in antitrust law serve purposes analogous to per se restrictions upon, for example, stunt flying in congested areas or speeding. Laws prohibiting stunt flying or setting speed limits are justified by the State's interest in protecting human life and property. Perhaps most violations of such rules actually cause no harm. No doubt many experienced drivers and pilots can operate much more safely, even at prohibited speeds, than the average citizen.

[\*434] If the especially skilled drivers and pilots were to paint messages on their cars, or attach streamers to their planes, their conduct would have an expressive component. High speeds and unusual maneuvers would help to draw attention to their messages. Yet the laws may nonetheless be enforced against these skilled persons without proof that their conduct was actually harmful or dangerous.

In part, the justification for these per se rules is rooted in administrative convenience. They are also supported, however, by the observation that every speeder and every stunt pilot poses some threat to the community. An unpredictable event may overwhelm the skills of the best driver or pilot, even if the [\*\*\*\*45] proposed course of action was entirely prudent when initiated. A bad driver going slowly may be more dangerous that a good driver going quickly, but a good driver who obeys the law is safer still.

**2---“prohibition” means forbid.**

**Eaton** et al. **17**, Joseph Van Eaton, Gail Karish, Gerard Lavery Lederer, lawyers for Best Best & Krieger, Llp. Michael Watza, (3-8-2017, KITCH DRUTCHAS WAGNER VALITUTTI & SHERBROOK, “BEFORE THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C”, COMMENTS OF SMART COMMUNITIES SITING COALITION, https://tellusventure.com/downloads/policy/fcc\_row/smart\_communities\_siting\_coaltion\_comments\_mobilitie\_8mar2017.pdf)

2. What are at issue legally are prohibitions and effective prohibitions, and not hindrances, as the Commission seems to suggest in its Notice. The term “prohibit” is not defined in the Act, but it has an ordinary meaning: to formally forbid (something) by law, rule, or other authority; or to “prevent, stop, rule out, preclude, make impossible.” A mere “hindrance” “is simply notin accord withthe ordinaryand fairmeaning” of the term prohibit,104 and can provide no basis for additional Commission intrusions on local authority over wireless facilities. Much of what Mobilitie complains about is a “hindrance” at most (and usually a hindrance magnified by its own actions).

#### The rule of reason is the opposite of a prohibition.

Loevinger 61, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division. (Lee, “The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law”, *Section of Antitrust Law* , Vol. 19, PROCEEDINGS AT THE ANNUAL MEETING, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, AUGUST 7 THROUGH 11, 1961, pp. 245-251, JSTOR, Accessed: 9-13-2021)

Running through the history of antitrust law are two contrapuntal themes: A prohibition of restraint of trade and a principle lately called the "rule of reason" which limits the prohibition. The legal rule against restraint of trade began in the 15th century in cases holding that a contract by which a man agreed not to practice his trade or profession was illegal.1 However, in the course of development of the common law, it became established that agreements which were ancillary to the sale or transfer of a trade or business and which were limited so as to impose a restriction no greater than reasonably necessary to protect the purchaser's interest.2

#### Vote neg:

#### 1---GROUND---balancing tests devastate core links, because they allow the practice when it’s beneficial. AND, creates a moving target, because the disallowed behavior is context-dependent.

#### 2---LIMITS---they lead to a wave of novel legal standard plans.

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#### RACIAL CAPITALISM:

#### The plan strengthens free markets and saves capitalism.

Parakkal & Bartz-Marvez 13, \*Assistant Professor of International Relations, Philadelphia University, \*\*Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Miami. (Raju, Sherry, Winter 2013, “Capitalism, democratic capitalism, and the pursuit of antitrust laws”, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 58, No. 4, DOI: 10.1177/0003603X1305800409)

Antitrust laws have historically been associated with countries that possess a free-market capitalist economy, which is understood as an economic system in which competition and the market forces of demand and supply determine economic outcomes. This historical association between capitalism and antitrust laws is evident from the fact that the countries that first adopted national antitrust laws, such as Canada, the United States, and the countries of Western Europe, are countries that have long embraced a market economy. On the contrary, the statist economies of the erstwhile Soviet bloc and many developing countries, for the most part, did not institute antitrust laws of the type associated with free market economies. Notwithstanding these country examples, which indicate a positive association between a capitalist economic system and antitrust laws, there exist arguments that both support and oppose antitrust laws for a capitalist economy. Arguments in support of antitrust laws for a capitalist economy begin with the fundamental understanding that the most important ingredient of a capitalist system is market competition. The presence of a competitive market is vital to achieving the efficiency levels that a capitalist economy seeks. Therefore, competitive forces need to be protected to discipline the market players, especially the dominant ones. By preventing and punishing anticompetitive practices by market players, an antitrust law protects and promotes market competition. 1 In the United States, which is commonly understood to be the leading bastion of free-market capitalism and one of the first countries to enact an antitrust law, the role of antitrust legislation in preserving the capitalist character of its economic system is underscored by the near-constitutional status accorded to its antitrust statues by the U.S. Supreme Court. 2 The Court described these statutes as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” and “as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”3 Such a sentiment is appropriate, given that the American antitrust law, the Sherman Act, was passed in 1890 to protect economic competition from rapidly-growing “trusts.”4 While the social and political zeitgeist has changed considerably since the passing of the Sherman Act, the fact remains that antitrust is perceived as key to “protecting consumers against anticompetitive conduct that raises prices, reduces output, and hinders innovation and economic growth.”5 Moreover, it is understood that “competition is a public good, and society cannot expect the victims of anticompetitive conduct to protect themselves.”6 The implication therefore is that government power, through the enforcement of antitrust statutes, is critical to reining in corporate power in order to protect economic competition and capitalism.

#### The 1AC in anchored in a calculative economic model that’s prefigured to naturalize conquest and racial exploitation.

Hardin & Towns 19, \*Carolyn, Assistant Professor of Media and Communication & American Studies @ Miami University. \*\*Armond R., Department of Communication Studies @ The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. (December 2019, “Plastic Empowerment: Financial Literacy and Black Economic Life”, *American Quarterly*, Volume 71, Number 4, pg. 978-980)

Homo Economicus’s Others: Black Objects and Black Debt

One of the financial literacy programs run by the government, Money Smart, is a free “instructor-led curriculum” that can be taught in “a classroom or small group setting.”56 The curriculum covers “deposit and credit services offered by financial institutions, choosing and maintaining a checking account, spending plans, the importance of saving, how to obtain and use credit effectively, and the basics of building or repairing credit.”57 These materials, among many others, display the basic and well-established assumptions of financial literacy education: that individual financial stability requires rational calculations and decision-making. In other words, financial literacy is a normative project to bring individuals into compliance with the simplistic assumptions of economic models, or what James Kwak terms “economism.”58 As such, financial literacy acknowledges and seeks to remediate what behavioral economists have long noted: that models do not match reality because individuals do not act rationally.59 However, if individuals can be made to act rationally, optimal economic outcomes can be achieved. In other words, the purpose of financial literacy is to make each of us a well-functioning and rational “homo economicus,” the idealized subject of free market capitalism.

Financial literacy is just the latest narrative to deploy a version of homo economicus as the baseline subject of economic rationality. Although the term is said to have originated only in the nineteenth century in response to the writing of John Stuart Mill, the notion of a “proper” capitalist subject who acts correctly within various models of capitalism is much older.60 It is also a raced subject. The history of capitalism reveals that the dominant notion of economic rationality is constructed as/in a white subject over and against black bodies both as objects rather than subjects of capitalism and as intense targets of exploitative debt. This racial tension at the heart of economic rationality reveals the racial stakes of calls for financial literacy education of black consumers.

White Subject, Black Object

According to Michel Foucault, the homo economicus of the late twentieth century eschews the early political economic concern of buying and selling one’s own labor power—with all its potentially collectivist political implications—for the individualized pursuit of self-interest “as an entrepreneur of himself.”61 Foucault offers as evidence Gary Becker’s universalizing idea of “human capital.” Homo economicus is he who can solve any social problem by accumulating human capital that produces an earnings stream for the entrepreneur of himself. But this entrepreneurial self-determination is not equally accessible by all raced subjects. According to Denise Ferreira da Silva, the black is not self-determined but “outer-determined,” which is to say, always open to being “affected,” manipulated by the Western subject for his own benefit.62 The black, then, functions as one about whom choices are made, not one who makes choices.

Sylvia Wynter provides the most explicit argument of the overrepresentation of homo economicus as white within the Western construct of the human, which she argues cannot be disarticulated from capitalism. Indeed, homo economicus emerges out of the shift from the Renaissance’s conceptions of politics and Western Judeo-Christianity as signifiers of the human, what she calls “Man1,” to “Man2,” or “a figure based on the Western bourgeoisie’s model of being human that has been articulated as, since the latter half of the nineteenth century, liberal monohumanism’s homo oeconomicus.”63 Likewise, Lisa Tilley argues that Wynter’s homo economicus is a revision of a racialized humanness, “formulated within the colonial episteme’s Darwinian distortions as divided between the naturally selected (Europeans) and the naturally ‘dysselected’ (those racialized as naturally inferiority).”64 Wynter finds the origins of this shift in humanness in the “colonial matrix of power.”65 In her essay “1492,” she argues that Christopher Columbus functioned as a racialized turning point for Europe, one that replaced Western religious conceptions of knowledge, such as the world being flat, with secularized conceptions of the world.66 Further, Columbus’s voyage had as much to do with spreading Chris- tianity and glorifying the Spanish nation as it did with enriching “himself and his family with all the gold and tribute he could extort from the indigenous peoples, even from making some into cabezas de indios y indias (heads of Indian men and women), who could be sold as slaves.”67

Wynter notes that Columbus is often positioned in terms of celebratory American “discovery” in ways that brush over the colonial, nationalistic, and imperialistic implications of his individual financial aspirations and the objectification of black bodies on which those aspirations depended. Walter Mignolo follows Wynter, providing some insight into the racial foundations of homo economicus, particularly connecting it to Western colonialism and imperialism, both of which are inseparable from the post-Columbian context.68 Mignolo argues that the self-interested optimization that fleshes out the figure of homo economicus assumes coloniality and imperialism.69 In effect, Western colonial enrichment—at the expense of indigenous racial others of Europe—is already inherent in the “economic rationality” of homo economicus, as it is seen as a financially rational tool of enrichment, rather than a moral wrong.

Elsewhere Wynter claims that the proto-notion of homo economicus that circulated in the sixteenth century underwent important transformations by the nineteenth century. Further removed from Judeo-Christianity, conceptions of economic rationality in the nineteenth century functioned in raced form to articulate both black and indigenous populations in the “New World” as the epitome of economic irrationality. Wynter notes that by the nineteenth century, the black slave “would now be made into the physical referent of the ostensibly most racially inferior and non-evolved Other to Man, itself redefined as optimally homo economicus.”70 The black slave is in effect the defining opposite of homo economicus, that nonbeing who is less than human and/ or not human at all. Where homo economicus is self-interested and free to choose—the subject who can fulfill the ultimate human goal of surplus accumulation on his own—the slave is utterly removed from not only this goal but even the possibility of choosing or acting within the construct of the self.

#### The aff’s fantasy of perfecting liberal internationalism sublimates racial inequalities. US dominance is unsustainable and reproduces racial hierarchies on a global scale.

Parmar 18, Professor of International Politics @ University of London (Inderjeet, The US-led Liberal Order: Imperialism by Another Name? *International Affairs*, 151–172; DOI: 10.1093/ia/iix240)

The overall finding is that liberal internationalist thinking/theory is, in effect (albeit unconsciously on the part of its proponents), a legitimating ideology rather than an effective explanatory frame for understanding the way in which the LIO actually works. That conclusion is reached, in part, by suggesting the applicability of a rather different perspective on the operations of the LIO and US power: specifically, a synthesized Gramscian–Kautskyian framework, explained below.

The key point is that the LIO is a class-based, elitist hegemony—strongly imbued with explicit and implicit racial and colonial/imperial assumptions—in both US domestic and foreign relations. At home, this analysis helps to explain in part the phenomenon of the ‘left behind’ white working/middle class, including the affluent but economically anxious voters whose salience on the right has transformed US politics since the Reagan revolution of the 1980s.2 Responding to the (minorities’) rights revolution of the 1960s, and the loss of economic opportunity and decline in living standards due to technological change and the global redistribution of industry,3 white working- and middle-class voters drifted towards the Republicans as the party of low taxes and fiscal conservatism.4 This delivered little in material terms, however; and, as inequality increased with market freedom and real wages stagnated, workers in the ‘rust belt’ and other areas grew increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo of establishment politics, their frustration exacerbated by anxieties about ethno-racial diversity and American identity as the United States moves towards a society in which whites are a minority.5 The result was the election as president in 2016 of Donald Trump on an overtly anti-conservative and barely concealed white identity platform at home and a programme of protectionism and non-interventionism—America First—abroad.6

Yet political dissatisfaction or disaffection was not confined to the political right.7 ‘Occupy Wall Street’ and other movements and groups vented their anger at the inequalities of power, wealth and income, particularly in the wake of the Iraq War and the 2008 financial crisis.8

In external policy, the analysis helps to explain the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of the US readily embracing a more diverse international order, as well as the character of that very embrace.9 Accepting nations of the global South on an equal footing may become a strategic necessity, but the process remains problematic given the racialized discourses of western power over the past several centuries, fortified in the United States by the experience of the slave trade, slavery, the ‘Jim Crow’ era, Orientalist views of Asians, and other factors.10 Class power helps to explain the strategic embrace of foreign elites as the sources of change and the agents of American influence, however diluted it may have been due to target states’ national interest considerations. Those at the apex of America’s hierarchies sought to forge alliances with and incorporate their foreign elite counterparts— with their full cooperation—in South Korea and China.11 Hence, the liberal internationalist ‘successes’ in the cases of South Korea and China must be qualified by considering the repercussions of developing market-oriented societies marked by economic inequality, rising social unrest and varying degrees of political repression. In ‘successful’ China and South Korea, as in India and other emerging powers, there remain major challenges underpinned by profound inequalities in power, wealth and income, associated with a politics that is frequently class-based but also heavily racialized and xenophobic.12

Why choose South Korea and China as key cases? Although these are two very different states, varying in global significance, and analysed at different periods of historical time, they do allow us to test out important claims made by liberal internationalists. South Korea is considered as a key test at the very birth of the US-led order—at a time when we might expect the new principles embodied in the UN, such as the rule of law, the lessons of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials, the Geneva Conventions and the rights of civilians in combat zones, to be pursued with some determination if not fully achieved. Given the fervour of anti-colonialism at the time, and US claims to champion that cause, we might also expect the behaviour of the international system’s leading power to differ sharply from that of colonial rulers in what became known as the Third World. The case of South Korea tells us a great deal about the practical application of a new international system developed by US power within an international system of rules, applicable to hegemon and others alike, a key liberal internationalist claim.

China’s integration into the US-led international system from the late 1970s also tells us a great deal about the character of the international order, especially about how significant change is managed within it and what the embrace of diversity means in practical terms. By the 1970s, the US-led order was facing challenges, of course—from West Germany and Japan, for example, and the oil-producing states—not to mention demands from the G77 for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and was also recovering from defeat in Vietnam and the legitimacy crisis following the Watergate scandal. For liberal internationalists, the integration of China is claimed as a success story both for the liberal order and for China. Yet, without denying the country’s dramatic increase in economic power, I question the character of China’s success, given the high levels of internal turmoil and the extremes of inequality that are giving rise to major political and economic instability. China, then, is a test of the claim that the liberal order rewards societies as a whole; a Gramscian–Kautskyian counter-argument would suggest that it is largely the Chinese ruling elite and its business allies, not the mass of ordinary Chinese, who have been accommodated in the US-led international system.

Liberal internationalism: theory, ideology, practice

Liberal internationalism is an ambiguous, multifaceted approach to understanding, explaining, justifying and practising international politics. One aspect of it is as a positive theory taught in academic International Relations (IR), derived from liberalism as applied to international affairs, explaining how the foreign policies of leading states, especially the United States and Britain, work. It is also a normative world-view, used by some of its proponents to indicate what the world ought to look like and how it might, and frequently does, work. Liberal internationalism, therefore, is also a set of policies, institutions and established practices.13

As an IR theory, the key pillars of liberalism, as embodied in liberal societies, are limited government, individual freedom, private property, pluralism and tolerance, progress, institutions and cooperation for peace, and interdependence. As a theory of US foreign policy, which is the object of analysis here, it encompasses democratic values, economic interdependence, international institutions as a framework for cooperation in addressing global crises and problems, and the broad promotion of general welfare. Emerging historically from the era of rising anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, with the United States and Britain in the lead, the US-led order laid claims to being opposed to colonial rule, and in favour of national and human rights, within a system of international power undergirded by rules binding hegemon and others alike. It was promoted not as a continuation of empire by other means, but as a new system based on universalistic principles applicable to all regardless of race, colour or history.

For my immediate purposes, it is unnecessary to disentangle the positive from the normative, the theoretical from the practical, because this framework of thought emerges both from deep principles and also as a set of solutions to international problems, especially world wars. Hence, liberal internationalism is frequently referred to as Wilsonianism, after the internationalist programme promulgated by US President Woodrow Wilson after the First World War that included the formation of the League of Nations, the forerunner of the longer-lasting post-1945 United Nations system.

I argue here that, as a theory, it operates as ideological legitimation even when its proponents offer reform; it justifies the status quo. In that regard it differs little overall from other theories like Marxism, for example, or realism. But because it is the principal system of ideas and practices, and ideals, that are used to explain, implement and defend the present international status quo, I would suggest that it elides too much to be fully validated beyond the circle of its proponents. Of course, it explains aspects of the world’s functioning; but its interpretation tends to be benign: crises and challenges are explained as resolvable within the system’s governing principles through socialization, integration and assimilation.

I use the term liberal internationalism, then, as an amalgam to suggest that, while it is all of the above, upon reflection it serves within academia and in IR as a positive theory of how things actually are—that is, as the opposite of an ideology. It purports to be able to explain the world, at the same time as its adherents are normative supporters of the theory. I show that it is actually ideological, because it elides key factors of how the liberal world order actually works, and that other theories suggest better ways of explaining the world.

In the next section of the article, I analyse liberal internationalist ideas and claims in more depth and more critically, with a view to identifying key elements of a more viable framework to explain the LIO—a critical theory influenced by the work of Antonio Gramsci and to some extent synthesized with the work of Karl Kautsky. The principal aim of this article is to identify the weaknesses of liberal internationalism in practice with the purpose of opening space for subsequent theorizing. In sum, what appears to be missing from liberal internationalism is any recognition of domestic power inequalities—such as those based on class and race—its broad attachment to (democratic) elitism, and its hierarchical approach to other powers, especially in the global South.

While Wilsonian liberal internationalism is widely recognized as privileging a belief in the free movement of people, capital, goods and services, less attention has been given to its origins in a time when ‘international relations’ was overtly understood as ‘race relations’, and its consequent implication in managing overtly racialized imperial power after the First World War.14 The Wilson administration’s role in racially segregating the US federal government had its foreign policy counterpart in a belief in an eventual, but far distant, self-government of the colonies and opposition to a Japanese proposal for a racial equality clause in the charter of the fledgling League of Nations.15 The development of liberal internationalism, then, was symbiotically bound to Wilson’s conviction that US intervention in world affairs was essential, and to what were effectively parastatal organizations created both by the federal executive and by private foundations—the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, among others. Wilsonian ‘theory’ was practical, idealistic and ideological from the very beginning. It is also the case that, long after overt racial discourses became politically damaging, subliminal racial thinking remained—and (unconsciously) remains—a significant element of liberal internationalism, affecting its analyses of the politics of domestic and global demographic power shifts.16

Nevertheless, liberal internationalists are cosmopolitans—opposed to narrow nationalism and trade protectionism, within a US-led international system. But its core ideas—rule of law, superiority of the western idea (however lightly worn), a rules-based institutional order open to all, in principle—are deeply embedded in US political-intellectual elite think-tanks, university public policy schools, corporate media and the leaderships of both main political parties,17 the core of the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant establishment.18 Importantly, however, there are influential voices in the emerging powers and regions that support the liberal international order by calling for internal reform to take account of the changing distribution of global power away from the West and towards the ‘rest’.19

The upshot is a broad consensus around certain core ideas: that the post-1945 rules-based world order, whatever its weaknesses, serves the world well by spreading prosperity and maintaining peace; and that, although it cannot continue unreformed, the US-led system draws on deep resources—economic, military, systemic and ‘soft’—that bestow upon it continuing strengths to contain, engage, manage and socialize emerging powers. Charles Kupchan lists a range of problems requiring US leadership, even if only within a suitably reformed international system reflecting ‘the real distribution of power’.20

John Ikenberry of Princeton University, the leading proponent of this school of thought, makes significant claims as well as several unquestioned assumptions, undeveloped allusions to core powers’ violent and other connections with the periphery, and a number of significant silences. He claims, for example, that the United States is a fully functioning democracy, yet fails to acknowledge evidence of the power of racialized, class-based elites. For critical theorists, such as Robert Cox, Stephen Gill and Craig Murphy,21 the international relations of elites across states and societies operate to reproduce extant patterns of power and manage or engineer change to the benefit of elites in a generally zero-sum game in which broad masses and lower classes lose out. This is clearly a far cry from liberal internationalist claims associated with the benefits of globalization, notwithstanding proposed ameliorative remedies against the harshest effects. Likewise, claims about the centrality of the rule of law occlude consideration of significant violations in practice. The question of imperial power is hardly addressed, and there is a general Eurocentric neglect of the significance of global areas beyond the core to the ‘welfare’ and cohesion of the core itself. There is a clear link between Ikenberry’s overt theory of American democracy and its liberal-hegemonic world role. The United States, and the western order it built, is characterized as a pluralistic liberal market democracy that is broadly inclusive and tolerant of ethnic diversity. The US-built security community exhibits its leading state’s internal character as a plural one and, very significantly, one in which the United States is bound by rules.22 Yet liberal internationalists’ underlying assumptions effectively deny the findings of numerous well-researched studies challenging American democracy’s principal claims.23

As far as Ikenberry and Deudney (and many others) are concerned, the ‘western idea’ is a significant part of the strength of the US-led order.24 The West, a spectacularly successful ‘civilizational heritage’, was underpinned by America’s New Deal liberalism, and extended globally via Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan and NATO. In effect, this vision and programme aimed to defuse domestic class conflict and the threat of war through ‘activist government, political democracy, and international alliance’. That system is in principle capable of assimilating emerging powers, given the universalism of its values and its tolerance of ethnic differences, although others joining this privileged grouping are expected to conform to its rules and accept US leadership. Western order is exclusive also because special rules apply within its zone of peace. Beyond it, conversely, other rules apply—cruder, neo-imperial and violent, although the implications of this contrast are left unaddressed.25 By drawing a line around the West, Ikenberry cuts off the rest of the world while addressing questions about the sources of world order which, empirically, lie in a symbiotic relationship between core and periphery. Yet, even within the ‘greater’ West, Japan and South Korea were not accorded the same treatment as western Europe.26 The LIO really was conceived and developed as a system of the West and the rest, in a zero-sum game. As Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, noted on Twitter in May 2017, the whole point of ‘Euro-Atlanticism’ was to ‘prevent post-West world order’.27

Yet the claim persists that this is no empire, despite America’s privileged place at the top of the ‘hierarchical political order’, because its hegemony is built on ‘consent’ and bounded by law. Power, which was necessary at the creation, faded away as consensual hegemony developed. This interpretation, of course, elides America’s overwhelming military superiority, including in and over Europe. Beyond Europe, however, Ikenberry concedes that American hegemony remained hierarchical, ‘with much fainter liberal characteristics’,28 again closing off an avenue of analytical and empirical analysis that might threaten the intellectual edifice of the LIO.

The (unconsciously) racialized world-view of Ikenberry’s Eurocentrism is subtly buttressed by Walter Russell Mead’s exploration of the significance of superior Anglo-Saxons who win wars, build world structures, and govern efficiently owing to ethno-cultural, not biological, characteristics.29 Mead’s interpretation of Anglo-Saxonism makes it appear benign, assimilative and universal— a scaffolding to support Ikenberry’s more overtly institutional analysis.

Assimilating minorities, however, is not embracing diversity—learning from other cultures and creating something new; it is maintaining conformity to the cultures of the powerful, dominant group.30 Looking to the future, as new global powers emerge, Mead advises America to both embrace and contain them, retaining military superiority should ‘rising’ powers become ‘opponents’.31 Mead complements the prescriptions of other liberal-realist internationalists, all seeking to incorporate, assimilate and mobilize emerging powers to absorb difference and produce conformity.

The liberal view is challenged by scholars who argue that the New Deal order effectively represented a political compromise, made in order to attain class peace and greater productivity, that mainly benefited major corporations while incorporating organized labour and thereby drawing its teeth. The postwar settlement was a narrow one—excluding racial minorities, unskilled and unorganized labour, and women—and relied on war and a heavily militarized economy that arose with the war in Korea and led directly to that in Vietnam.32 Liberal internationalists’ accounts elide the class, gendered and racial bases of the order, both at home and abroad. Ikenberry paints an appealing picture of a liberal order that delivered material benefits and security to all, while also raising some doubts about the operation of the system, especially with regard to the inequality of rewards generated by globalization and its potential political consequences. Those consequences are regarded by Ikenberry as posing the greatest threats to the stability of the liberal order, laying bare a central mechanism and dynamic of the system itself: market-driven class inequality, exacerbated in a society in which racialized class politics is salient.33 Yet Ikenberry never mentions class, race or gender—an omission central to critical theories of the making of the LIO.34

The other key omission is the role played in building the order by violence and outright war—not just the Second World War but also the Korean War, the ‘hot’ war at the birth of the order that propelled the formation of NATO, the rearmament of Germany, the security alliance with Japan and indeed the US military–industrial complex.35 Accordingly, a key focus of consideration here is wartime planning for a new world order and the manner of its foundation as a direct result of military violence that violated the UN Charter, international law, the lessons of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Wars ‘out there’ secured the core ‘over here’.36

And, of course, what is referred to as benign ‘liberal internationalism’ is what Mark Mazower refers to as ‘imperial internationalism’—trying to maintain a global hierarchy established by centuries of colonial and semi-colonial rule over what is now called the global South.37

Finally, the construction of the postwar western order was constitutive of a political, social, economic and ideological ‘vital center’, as Schlesinger terms it38—opposed to both right-wing nationalists and left-wing anti-imperialists. This entailed the acceptance by core forces of the ‘New Deal order’ that the price of class harmony, stability and mobility at home was the export and continuation of inequality,39 and therefore military violence, on the periphery; and that the removal of vast quantities of raw materials required a global military basing strategy, both to protect allied trade and to deny it to adversaries.40 Ikenberry accurately notes that the internal character of the leading state in the liberal order has an impact on the international system it built; but I diverge from his presentation of this impact as the externalization of a democratic regime. He elides the racial, class and gendered character of American historical, economic and political development—including that of Wilsonianism itself.41 His conclusion, however, is accurate, even if he fails to recognize its significance in the building and maintenance of the liberal order: ‘Access to resources and markets, socioeconomic stability, political pluralism, and American security interests—all were inextricably linked.’42

The framework that may best fit the actual underlying engine of liberal orderbuilding and maintenance, however, must also incorporate understanding of the ‘soft’ processes of socialization or incorporation. Violence is a powerful tool, but always and everywhere it is connected with the processes of non-violent elite socialization and alliance-building. It is one of the great strengths of Ikenberry’s analysis of international order that elite socialization is considered so significant.43 Yet a critical view of elite socialization in the building and perpetuation of hegemony views it not as a reflection of a democratic and benign foreign policy, but as incorporation into hegemonic agendas or ‘domestication’.44 In the Gramscian perspective, capitalist Great Powers, including the United States, are deeply unequal at home and imperialistic abroad, ultimately pursuing the interests of their ruling classes and elites, whether embedded in private, public or state– private realms.45 Their hegemony is a combination of persuasion and coercion involving a ‘state–society complex’.46 Admittedly, liberalism gives an account of elite socialization processes that overlaps with Gramscian approaches. However, liberal approaches see it as relatively benign, politically neutral or representative of democracy/popular sovereignty.

#### Racial capitalism subordinates billions and threatens extinction.

Gonzalez 20, Morris I. Leibman Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago School of Law and Professor Emerita at Seattle University School of Law. (Carmen, 10-27-2020, "Climate Change and Racial Capitalism", *LPE Project*, <https://lpeproject.org/blog/climate-change-and-racial-capitalism/>)

Racialized communities have borne the brunt of the carbon-based capitalist world economy from its colonial origins through the contemporary climate crisis. They have been enslaved, exploited, dispossessed, and subjected to both the physical violence of invasion and occupation and the structural “slow violence” of polluting industry. From the Niger Delta to the Canadian tar sands, racially subordinated populations living in the shadows of oil drilling, coal mining, oil and gas pipelines, power plants, refineries, and petrochemical plants are poisoned by toxic chemicals and treated as surplus and disposable. In my article in the inaugural issue of JLPE, I break new ground by examining climate change and climate change-induced displacement through the framework of racial capitalism. Drawing upon the work of political theorist Cedric Robinson and sociologist Aníbal Quijano, I treat racism and capitalism as inextricably intertwined. Robinson argues that capitalism emerged from a feudal order thoroughly infused with racial (or proto-racial) hierarchies. Quijano identifies Europe’s violent conquest of the Americas as the pivotal event that globalized white supremacy and established the capitalist world economy. Both have analyzed how racism makes oppression socially acceptable by portraying large segments of humanity as inferior, unworthy, and expendable. In my article, I focus on how the global capitalist order has used racism to create the conditions for the massive unchecked resource extraction that has caused global climate change and for pushing the burden of its impacts onto those who are most vulnerable and least responsible. CLIMATE INJUSTICE Climate change is caused primarily by the world’s most affluent inhabitants but threatens the lives and livelihoods of those who contributed least to the problem. As climate change intensifies, those most susceptible to climate-related disasters and displacement are also overwhelmingly persons classified as non-white. They reside in vulnerable geographic locations (such as coastal zones, the Arctic, and the Pacific island states), and have been deprived of the resources to protect themselves from harm through centuries of predatory economic policies. Despite the disproportionate impact of climate change on vulnerable populations who have been largely ignored due to their racialization, legal scholarship on climate displacement has often adopted a doctrinal approach that fails to analyze the underlying systemic causes of the climate crisis and its relationship to race and racism. I focus on international law in particular. CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW International law has mounted an inadequate response to the climate crisis. The climate treaties have failed to curb global temperature increases, and have delivered insufficient adaptation assistance to climate-vulnerable states and peoples. Even though climate-related disasters and slow-onset events (such as sea level rise) threaten to displace millions of people, international law provides very limited protection to persons who flee their country of origin to escape the ravages of climate change. Neither the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the treaties governing climate change requires countries to admit climate-displaced persons. Part of the problem is that international law has been complicit in the project of racial capitalism. As Antony Anghie explains, international law originates in the colonial encounter and has justified successive Northern interventions in the Global South through a variety of doctrines – including terra nullius, the doctrine of discovery, the mandate system, trusteeship, modernization, and development. International law has depicted Southern peoples as so primitive, savage, uncivilized, backward, and under-developed that their lives, livelihoods, and cultures are unworthy of protection. It has also created the rules and institutions of the capitalist world system through which Northern states and transnational corporations maintain an iron grip on the states and people of the South, including trade law, foreign investment law, and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. EMERGING LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES TO CLIMATE DISPLACEMENT In the absence of a binding legal framework, three emerging legal and policy responses to climate displacement threaten to reinforce racialized hierarchies and to trap large segments of humanity in places that are becoming uninhabitable. First, the national security response constructs climate-displaced persons as barbarians crashing the gates of civilization, and has fostered the criminalization, detention, and expulsion of migrants. Second, the humanitarian response reinforces racial hierarchies by portraying climate-displaced persons as primitive, backward, and in need of charity rather than justice. Its voluntary initiatives to protect disaster-displaced persons obscure the Global North’s responsibility for climate change and have little chance of succeeding at a time of rising nationalism and xenophobia. Third, the migration management response encourages climate-displaced persons to finance climate resilience in their home countries through temporary labor migration. This approach shifts responsibility for climate change adaptation from affluent states to exploitable workers from the world’s poorest and most climate-vulnerable populations. The exodus of able-bodied workers may also exacerbate the vulnerability of “trapped populations” (darker-skinned, older, disabled) by producing a brain drain, labor shortages, and reliance on erratic remittance flows. A JUST SOLUTION TO CLIMATE DISPLACEMENT? Another way is possible. Climate-vulnerable states and peoples have called for an approach to climate displacement grounded in their collective right to self-determination and to legal continuity as self-governing communities on the territories of other states. This proposal deserves consideration. Successful implementation of it requires a responsibility-based framework that imposes obligations on affluent states to finance the mobility decisions of climate-displaced populations based on their contribution to the climate crisis. The self-determination approach is an example of the ways that Southern states and peoples are developing counter-hegemonic interpretations of international law that will permit them to shape their own history and transcend the colonially-imposed borders that impede mobility and increase climate vulnerability. An analysis of climate displacement grounded in racial capitalism must identify who benefits from policies that stoke racism and militarize borders. These beneficiaries include the corporations that provide surveillance, border walls, and detention facilities; the security apparatus of the state; the businesses that exploit undocumented or incarcerated migrants; and the authoritarian populists who demonize migrants in order to persuade working class whites to support policies that intensify economic inequality and hasten catastrophic climate change. Although greenhouse gases do not respect national borders, national elites deploy racialized systems of border control to perpetuate the illusion that persons classified as white can somehow escape the economic and ecological ravages of capitalism by erecting walls and fortresses. Racism enables states and corporations to pursue policies catastrophic to the planet and its inhabitants because the worst and most immediate consequences are inflicted on stigmatized populations in the sacrifice zones of the fossil fuel economy. While focusing on the problem of climate displacement, the article uses the framework of racial capitalism to highlight how the struggles for racial, economic, and climate justice are interconnected and interdependent. Racism creates divisions between people whose economic and ecological vulnerability should serve as the basis for solidarity and resistance. As economic inequality increases and the planet’s ecosystems are brought to the brink of collapse, all but the ultra-affluent will become frontline communities in an increasingly damaged and dangerous world. Deconstructing racial hierarchies is necessary in order to foster the collective action required to avert climate catastrophe. Climate change is not an isolated crisis, but a symptom of an economic (dis)order that jeopardizes the future of life on this planet. Through a race-conscious analysis of climate change grounded in political economy, this article seeks to engage scholars in a variety of disciplines in order to develop more robust critiques of the laws, institutions, and ideologies that maintain racial capitalism and pose an existential threat to humanity.

#### Vote neg to reject the aff and affirm place-based cooperatives.

Bledsoe et al. 19, \*Adam, assistant professor in the Department of Geography and African American Studies Program at Florida State University. \*\*Tyler McCreary, assistant professor in the Department of Geography at Florida State University, \*\*\*Willie Jamaal Wright, assistant professor of geography at Florida State University. (“Theorizing diverse economies in the context of racial capitalism”, *Geoforum*, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.07.004>)

As acknowledged in the literature above, unorthodox value systems and modes of production are often present within Black-led cooperatives. Through collective community-building initiatives by groups like Cooperation Jackson and Cooperative Community of New West Jackson, Jackson has risen as a promising place for the incubation and application of economic, spatial, and political alternatives. Applying the analytic of marronage to discussions of commoning can contribute timely, place-based contributions to the study of cooperatives and the commons. Thinking of the commons, particularly of urban commons, through a lens of marronage may help residents and organizers in selecting and acquiring common property as well as in recreating modes of living beyond and before the (re)imposition of capital. Though communities are adept at determining their needs, as efforts such as D-Town Farms and the CCNWJ indicate, making academic resources, concepts, and methods available to collective and cooperative practices may lead to any number of fruitful and unforeseen outcomes. Finally, as residents and researchers are not immune to the trappings of spatial imaginaries based in logics of individual ownership (see Wright and Herman, 2018), an analytic of marronage has the potential to influence the spatial imaginaries of residents and researchers, alike, so that more of us come to view landscapes of marronage as more than blank slates for capitalist development but as the future of innumerable publics.

7. Conclusion

Analyses of racial capitalism are necessary in the drive to create alternatives to capitalism. If diverse economies hope to address phenomena like urban decay, gentrification, and environmental degradation, they must first recognize that notions of racial difference make such arrangements possible. Urban disinvestment, the repurposing of urban space, and the treatment of spaces as empty contribute directly to the reproduction of capitalist modes of production. In the context of North America, these mechanisms of accumulation occur precisely because the communities most affected by them remain subordinated to logics of conquest. The afterlives of settler colonialism and chattel slavery inform the realities of present-day capitalism, as the displacement and spatial fixing of Indigenous and Black populations—central to the initial rise of global capitalism—continue to be central characteristics of capital accumulation. Creating alternatives to capitalism thus means first recognizing how conquest continues to structure capitalist modes of production.

In the examples given above, Black and Indigenous communities provide clear analyses of the logics and concrete economic factors that oppress them. In recognizing how economic abandonment and intentional disinvestment from city spaces serve to reproduce capitalism and oppress their communities, Black communities in Detroit and Jackson and Indigenous communities in Winnipeg and Minneapolis offer a grounded theory of racial capitalism. These communal analyses explore particular manifestations of present-day capitalism, uncovering how capital accumulation takes place via the oppression of racialized populations. More importantly, these communities push beyond a diagnosis of oppressive dynamics and create place-specific alternatives to the expressions of capitalism they encounter. The establishment of public housing in Winnipeg and Minneapolis and the cultivation of commons through practices of marronage in Detroit and Jackson both entail alternatives to the forms of capitalism that displace the Indigenous and Black communities present in those cities. These communities, then, employ an analysis of racial capitalism to enact diverse economies.

Literature on diverse economies and actual, material creations of alternatives to capitalism can look to examples like those described above as they try to envision and implement economies that do not reproduce capitalist modes of production. Winnipeg, Minneapolis, Detroit, and Jackson are hardly the only locations in which capitalism has taken hold, and different locations will have to wage their own struggles against the specific forms of capitalism they face. Nonetheless, the movements described in this paper offer an important blueprint for how analysis and praxis can walk hand in hand. To create futures not dominated by capitalism requires both an honest assessment of the workings of racial capitalism and the ability to create alternatives to such arrangements. Looking to examples like those above are a starting point from which we can take both of these steps.

### 1NC

#### T: SUBSETS:

#### “Private sector” means all commercial enterprises.

Avis 16, International Development Department Research Fellow @ University of Birmingham. (Dr William Robert Avis, “Private sector engagement in fragile and conflict-affected settings”, *GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services Helpdesk Research Report* , 13.01.2016 <http://unprmeb4p.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Private-sector-engagement-in-fragile-and-conflict-affected-settings.pdf>, Accessed: 7-19-2021)---DFAT = Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the department of the Australian federal government responsible for foreign policy and relations, international aid, consular services and trade and investment.

Whilst PSD is considered to have an important role to play in the field of economic development, there is much debate over what constitutes ‘best practice’ in PSD and what the term private sector encompasses. The private sector1 [BEGIN FOOTNOTE 1] DFAT use the term ‘private sector’ to refer to all commercial enterprises (businesses) and includes individual farmers and street traders, small and medium enterprises, large locally-owned firms and multinational corporations.[END FOOTNOTE 1] can include local formal, informal and illegal actors, diaspora communities and regional and multinational players (Peschka, 2010). This review adopts DFATs definition of private sector engagement which is characterised as a tool to achieve better development outcomes in private sector development and human development.

#### A topical aff could change a universally applied standard, like the CWS [Consumer Welfare Standard]

Phillips 18, commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission. (Noah J. November 1, 2018, Before the Federal Trade Commission, “Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century,” <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1415284/ftc_hearings_session_5_transcript_11-1-18_0.pdf>)

Our second topic today is the consumer welfare standard. And I think most folks even out in the public know, this is the standard that we use across the board, mergers and conduct in courts and at agencies, to judge anticompetitive conduct. It is not only a standard that we in the U.S. apply, it is a standard that is used by competition agencies around the world. It is an economically-grounded standard, and it requires that there be harm to consumers for conduct to be condemned. Mere harm to competitors is considered insufficient. So let me repeat that again. There has to be harm to consumers, not just competitors. The reason that is so, the reason harm to competitors is considered insufficient is because sometimes a less-efficient firm losing sales or market share to a cheaper, more innovative or efficient rival, can be and often is consistent with vibrant competition and with outcomes that benefit consumers. Courts and agencies have embraced this standard for decades. Today, there are two very important discussions going on about the consumer welfare standard, and they are happening simultaneously. And I think it is important that we understand that there are two conversations going on. One is a continuing discussion about how we apply the standard, regarding whether enforcement is at the appropriate level, whether it is properly targeted. This is an introspective question on some level, in which scholars, economists, practitioners, and enforcers all ask ourselves, are we bringing the right kinds of cases? Are we using the right kinds of evidence? Should we be doing more or less in certain places? The antitrust bar, the business community, and others benefit from this ongoing and active analysis. The second discussion happening now, and the one on which today’s consumer welfare standard panels will focus, is whether the standard is itself the right metric we ought to use in antitrust enforcement and in antitrust law; some argue that enforcement under the consumer welfare standard has failed because of the law, and accordingly, that we should reform the law.

#### Violation: The aff targets a narrow subset of the private sector.

#### Vote neg:

#### ONE---limits---economic sectors are infinite---any industry, single companies, individuals, OR any permutation of these. That undermines depth and makes meaningful prep impossible.

#### TWO---ground---only broad reforms guarantee link uniqueness and prevent bidirectional affs that clarify an ambiguous statute in a way that weakens enforcement.

## ADV: TRADE

### 1NC---!D---Trade

#### Trade doesn’t solve war.

White 13, Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University. (Hugh, “China: Power and Ambition,” *The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power*, pg. 51-53, Oxford University Press)

Certainly, the more countries trade and invest with one another, the greater the economic cost of conflict and the stronger the incentive to keep the peace. America and China today are more interdependent economically than any two comparably powerful states have ever been before, and this will certainly restrain ambition and rivalry on both sides. The question is whether the restraints will prove stronger than the pressures going the other way. If interdependence does trump strategic and political ambition, we should be seeing it happening between the United States and China now – but we have not seen much evidence of that yet. So far the two countries seem to be acting very much as strong states in the past have acted as relative power shifts from one to the other. Pessimists like John Mearsheimer and Niall Ferguson remind us that before war broke out in 1914, the great powers of Europe had grown more economically interdependent than they had ever been before, and than they would be again for almost a century.12

The lesson to draw is that interdependence increases the incentive for leaders to subordinate political ambitions and ignore nationalist sentiments, but it does not remove the need for them to take these bold and [politically] politicaly risky steps. The hard choices still have to be made. It is easy for leaders to see that economic interests require them to compromise their countries’ aspirations for international status and power, but it is harder for them to acknowledge that to their people, and harder still to put their economic interests ahead of strategic and political ones when a choice has to be made. In fact, most often people see it as shameful to put economic concerns first when issues of power and status are engaged. What president would tell the American people that their country will compromise its position on an issue like Taiwan in order to protect America’s economic interests? What Chinese leader could make the same argument to the Chinese people? When a choice has to be made, especially when it has to be made in the glare of an international crisis, it is very hard to put economics first.

In some ways the obvious importance of economic interdependence increases rather than limits the risk that rivalry will escalate, because of the way it can affect one country’s view of the other’s priorities. There seems to be a pattern here: each side believes that the imperatives of interdependence will press more heavily on the other. That inclines both governments to assume that the other will compromise to protect the economic relationship, so they do not have to do so. In Washington they expect China to back down from its challenge to America once Beijing understands the economic risks of rivalry. In Beijing they think America will blink. That makes both of them less inclined to compromise their own position – which makes escalation more likely.

Ultimately, faith in the power of interdependence boils down to faith in the power of money to trump other emotions and motivations. That is a risky proposition. We cannot assume that Chinese leaders will always choose rationally to maximise China’s objective benefits. They are no less liable than the leaders of any other country to allow what may be, or may seem to us to be, irrational desires for status and influence to trump the rational calculations of national interest.

Economics is important, but money isn’t everything. Countries, like people, want to be rich, but they also want to be safe and to feel good about themselves. For countries, as for individuals, aspirations for security and identity often compete with material interests, and often win. America’s and China’s divergent visions touch on very deep issues of national identity in both countries, which can easily seem to outweigh economic imperatives when the crunch comes. And there is always something a little strange about the assumption, implicit in the interdependence argument, that our economic desires will suppress the urge to strategic and political competition when our desire to avoid the horrors of war will not.

### 1NC---Alt Causes

#### Alt causes to protectionism---populists like Trump and Le Pen plus retaliatory tariffs between China and the West.

#### COVID wrecked interdependence.

Kampf 20, senior PhD fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School. (David, 6/16/20, “How COVID-19 Could Increase the Risk of War”, *World Politics Review*, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28843/how-covid-19-could-increase-the-risk-of-war)

The coronavirus pandemic immediately elicited further calls to reduce dependence on other countries, with Trump using the opportunity to pressure U.S. companies to reconfigure their supply chains away from China. For its part, China made sure that it had the homemade supplies it needed to fight the virus before exporting extras, while countries like France and Germany barred the export of face masks, even to friendly nations. And widening economic inequalities, a consequence of the pandemic, are not likely to enhance support for free trade.

This assault on open trade and globalization is just one aspect of a decaying liberal international order, which, its proponents argue, has largely helped to preserve peace between nations since World War II. But that old order is almost gone, and in all likelihood isn’t coming back. The U.N. Security Council appears increasingly fragmented and dysfunctional. Even before Trump, the world’s most powerful country ratified fewer treaties per year under the Obama administration than at any time since 1945.

Trump’s presidency only harms multilateral cooperation further. He has backed out of the Paris Agreement on climate change, reneged on the Iran nuclear deal, picked fights with allies, questioned the value of NATO and defunded the World Health Organization in the middle of a global health crisis. Hyper-nationalism, rather than international collaboration, was the default response to the coronavirus outbreak in the U.S. and many other countries around the world.

### 1NC---Unequal Exchange

#### Trade furthers unequal exchange, which extracts wealth from the Global South to the Global North.

Ricci 18, Department of Economics Society and Politics, University of Urbino (Unequal Exchange in the Age of Globalization, *Review of Radical Political Economics*, Vol. 51, Issue 2, DOI: 10.1177/0486613418773753)

In conclusion, the sharp increase in international trade, subsequent to the creation of the WTO, was combined with a considerable increase, in absolute terms, of value transfers from emerging economies to the core of the capitalist world system. In this period, moreover, the fast increase in foreign direct investments, combined with the exponential rise in the number of TNCs, has resulted in a substantial increase in intra-firm TNC trade, now estimated in around one-third of global trade (Baiman 2017, chap. 8). The trade mispricing, due to transfer pricing practices within the same multinational group, is missed in standard trade data, and this fact probably leads to underestimating the real dimension of unequal exchange transfers. What seems certain, in any case, is that the industrialization and modernization of former poor agricultural countries, like China and other Asian countries, now fully integrated in global production and trade networks, did not substantially affect the economic power hierarchy of the capitalist world economy. The drain of value from the “periphery” to the “center” deriving from unequal exchange, albeit carried out in different forms than past colonial and neo-colonial relations, is firmly in the works in the age of globalization and continues to contribute to the uneven social and spatial reproduction of the modern capitalist economy.

6. Conclusion

In the current age of economic globalization, increasing world inequality and mass migration make the topic of unequal exchange in international trade even more relevant than in the past. Different schools of economic thought contributed to defining this concept. From the extensive literature on the subject, two main factors driving unequal exchange arise: differences in industrial specialization and differences in labor and capital incomes between countries. Several empirical studies have been devoted to measuring the quantitative dimension of value transfers in international and interregional trade. Recently, a new approach has been proposed, based on the difference between nominal and PPP exchange rates. The lack of a coherent theoretical framework has, however, limited empirical research only to particular aspects of unequal exchange.

The model presented in section 4, inspired by Marx’s analysis of rent in volume 3 of Capital, encompasses all the various forms of unequal exchange identified in the previous literature, on the basis of a proper definition of the different forms of international values. Value transfers originate from the contradictory character of socially necessary labor, which gives rise to a potential discrepancy between two different measures of value: value in production and value in circulation. In structural disequilibrium conditions between supply and demand, unequal exchange in a strict sense appears in the form of differential rent, due to different industrial specializations, and absolute rent, due to different labor and capital incomes. The former depends on the difference between market price of production and market value, and leads to interindustry value transfers, while the latter relies on the difference between market price and market price of production, and leads to intraindustry value transfers. In addition, there are interindustry value transfers due to different organic compositions of capital, or unequal exchange in a broad sense, deriving from the difference between international price of production and market value.

The model provides useful insights to the theoretical and empirical analysis of international value transfers. First, it overcomes a traditional problem triggered in Marxist unequal exchange theory by the presence of heterogeneous labor and nonspecific commodities. A consistent reduction procedure from national heterogeneous direct labors into international homogeneous labor, on one hand, and a trade network based on different national varieties of the same commodity, on the other, are presented, allowing us to define the different forms of international values of traded commodities. Second, the model shows that a recent empirical methodology of measuring international value transfers, based on the difference between current and PPP exchange rates, could only partially capture the full extent of unequal exchange in the world economy. Specifically, this approach does not succeed in considering interindustry value transfers.

Finally, estimates of unequal exchange in global trade for recent years are presented, showing that the size of value transfers, from developing and emerging countries to the core of the capitalist world economy, is relevant, both in absolute and relative terms. During the period considered (1995–2007), the relative size of differential rent decreased, to the benefit of absolute rent, indicating a process of convergence of industrial structures and, at the same time, a reduction in competition within individual markets, consistent with the thesis of a new international division of labor. In terms of income distribution, unlike Emmanuel’s thesis on Northern workers as exclusive beneficiaries of unequal exchange, value transfers are reflected in both higher profits and higher monetary wages per unit of international homogeneous labor in inflow countries.

In conclusion, the empirical analysis shows that unequal exchange is a relevant issue in the actual world economy, and therefore it should find greater consideration in trade negotiations, and in defining development policies. International value transfers deriving from global trade, without being the only cause of unfair international economic relations, represent an important mechanism in the reproduction of uneven development in the modern capitalist world economy. Unequal exchange in real trade deals with the distribution of the new value created in a given period, and it is studied by a flow analysis. But there are other mechanisms of unfair international economic relations, such as those related to the functioning of financial markets and the variation of the value of accumulated wealth (capital gains/losses), which would require a stock analysis able to include “wealth transfer effects” in addition to “(new) value transfer effects.” This issue could represent a suggestion for further research, aimed at extending the theoretical model and the empirical analysis to other important aspects of capitalist globalization.

### 1NC---!D---Interdependence

#### Interdependence causes war---empirics and asymmetry---can’t overcome fundamental disagreements.

van de Haar 20 (Edwin, independent scholar specializing in the liberal tradition in international political thought. He has lectured in international relations and political theory at Brown University, PhD from Maastricht University (2008), a MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (1997) and a MA in Political Science from Leiden University (1996), “Free trade does not foster peace,” 2020, DOI: 10.1111/ecaf.12405, DOA: 1-5-2020) //Snowball //strikethrough of rhetoric

The most obvious rebuttal of these arguments is empirical. It just did not happen. Countries trading with each other, all around the globe, have fought wars with one another, over and over again. Some recent examples are Russia and Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, and Saudi Arabia and Yemen. As Smith predicted, human nature is an important factor in the explanation. People will quarrel and fight: ultimately emotions rule reason. In the domestic situation, there is hardly anyone who thinks that people can do without police and judiciary, because some people simply will not obey the rules. The international system is without a court with enforcement powers. There are some structural constraints, but it remains a human affair. The fundamental insights of Smith and his contemporaries into human behaviour do not amount to some oldfashioned idea, long refuted by modern science. They are confirmed not only by modern economists such as Kahneman (2011) and international relations specialists such as Waltz (1954, pp. 16–79) and Donelan (2007), but also by theorists working on the border between evolutionary psychology and international affairs (Rosen, 2005; Rubin, 2002; Thayer, 2004).

The relationship between trade and economic interdependence is also far more complex. Economic interdependence matters sometimes, but it cannot trump power politics. As Copeland (2015, pp. 1–50, 428–46) makes clear, economic interdependence is sometimes a constraint on violent action by a state. Yet it could just as well be a cause of violent action, especially of a pre-emptive nature in the event that actors expect to be cut off from trade and other economic resources in the near future. In this way, the benefits of continued trade lose out against the expected economic vulnerability. Sobek (2009, pp. 107–27) adds that trade relations might lead to uneven power relationships, which may be a cause of war as well.

Also relevant here is the fact that free trade does not normally result in bilateral interdependence, except for trade in the rarest goods. Free trade leads to multilateral trade relations, and consequently there may be more than one country where particular goods can be bought. Therefore, in times of war, it is relatively easy to switch to suppliers from country A to country B or C. In this way warfare may be a less costly option than is assumed by the idea of economic interdependence.

Public opinion is not automatically opposed to war, as Cobden painfully found out during the Crimean War (1853–56). This has been evident many times since, not least in the two world wars. So the idea of public opinion as a pacifying factor influencing decision-makers must be discarded. It must also be noted that the public in any case hardly ever influences foreign policy decisions on war and peace (Hill, 2003, pp. 250–82).

Trade is unable to foster peace, because it is unable to overcome many causes of war. Think about cultural and religious differences, geopolitical causes such as the fight for natural resources, including increasingly rare raw materials, or more traditional wars between great powers or their proxies over a border dispute. States may also act against their economic interest for some perceived higher goal (Coker, 2014). The causes of war are often multifaceted and complex. Wars happen because people have reasons to fight, in the form of goals and grievances, and possess enough resources and resolve (Ohlson, 2009). Trade relations are just one factor in the mix of causes of war, which include such coincidental factors as chance, luck, or reckless behaviour by individuals who happen to influence public policy. International commerce is simply not a “perfectly effective antiwar device” (Suganami, 1996, pp. 153–210). The best one can say is that the protection of trade relations is sometimes one of the factors in the decision not to wage war. Nothing less, nothing more.

To sum up, many of Adam Smith's arguments still stand, and are confirmed or complemented by modern research. There is no solid ground for the expectation that trade promotes, fosters, or leads to peace. Generally, international economic interests are not the crucial factors in decisions over war and peace. Too many other factors come into play. To believe that trade fosters peace was folly even hundreds of years ago. To still think so is to believe in fairy tales, to be ~~blinded~~ [confused] by the correlates computed by limited yet available datasets, or both.

## ADV: RESOURCES

### 1NC---Defense---REMs

#### No REM shortages---stockpiles, new deposits, and recycling.

Lovins 17, Cofounder and Chairman Emeritus of Rocky Mountain Institute, energy advisor to major firms and governments in 70+ countries for 45+ years, has written 31 books and more than 600 papers, advised major firms and governments worldwide, and received 12 honorary doctorates and many international awards. (Amory, 5-23-2017, "Clean energy and rare earths: Why not to worry", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, https://thebulletin.org/2017/05/clean-energy-and-rare-earths-why-not-to-worry/)

Rare earths’ uses are highly specialized but diverse. These elements are used in mobile phones, superstrong magnets and hence advanced motors and generators, some oil-refinery catalysts, certain lasers and fluorescent-lamp or flat-screen phosphors, some batteries and superconductors, and other technologies important to modern life. Some rare earths are particularly useful in energy applications. Around 2010, some articles and commentators warned that shortages of rare earths, or China’s near-monopoly on them, could choke off the West’s shift to renewable energy and other clean technologies. This was never true—but the myth persists.

Bubble and burst. Rare earths concerned only specialists until about 2009–10. In the mid-1990s, China had consolidated its control over most of the global rare-earth market, and the last US mine and mill, once the world’s dominant producer, closed in 2002 because it was unprofitable. China began imposing export quotas in 2006, and limited exports to Japan (a major user of rare earths for high-tech miniature motors) during a diplomatic spat in 2009–10, so global prices and anxieties soared. US government agencies published urgent reports about the rare-earth crisis and its threat to national security. Could China’s control of these crucial elements—roughly 97 percent at the time—block Washington’s ability to produce Tomahawk missiles, F-35 jets, and night-vision goggles, as some military writers warned, never mind electric vehicles and wind-power turbines?

As a technologist who had advised major mining companies, written two books on metal mining and a 445-page text on efficient motor systems, done rare-earth physics experiments at MIT Lincoln Laboratory, and consulted for MIT’s Francis Bitter Magnet Laboratory, I knew enough to be unconvinced by rare-earth alarm bells. It all felt like a commodity bubble, based more on a shortage of understanding—of rare earths, economic geology, and resource efficiency and substitution—than on a shortage of rare earths.

Sure enough, the debate was heavy on the supply of rare earths but light and often misinformed on the demand side. The few observers who focused more on demand suspected that rare earths’ price spike wouldn’t last long, whether or not it reflected mining-stock hype. I called the coming crash, to general ridicule, in 2010. Rare-earth prices soared through spring 2011—when a rare-earth bonanza was fondly predicted for Helmand Province in Afghanistan—but then plummeted.

US supplier Molycorp reopened its California rare-earth mine in 2012, but went broke in 2015 when low world prices wouldn’t support its high costs. By 2015, MIT Technology Review asked, “What Happened to the Rare-Earths Crisis?” It misleadingly called rare earths “crucial to the permanent magnets used in wind turbines and motors in hybrid or electric cars,” and concluded that worries about them had “seemingly dissipated without much fanfare” as “demand fell more than expected,” but never connected the dots by asking why demand did that. By 2016–17, the market was in the doldrums, with China planning to limit annual production to 140,000 metric tons beginning in 2020 to try to raise prices again. An investor in the rare-earth industry in 2007 would have lost 81 percent of her portfolio value after a classic decade-long boom-and-bust wild ride (see the chart at the top of this article from buyupside.com).

This is not how a durably scarce and valuable commodity behaves. What happened? Just what you’d expect of a thin market influenced by ignorance but ultimately tamed by reality. When prices soared, stockpiles rose, idle mines reopened, explorers sought and found new deposits, and recycling increased (for example, cerium in glass polishing). Most important, as customers from General Electric to Toyota to Ford sought to cut costs and boost performance, the costlier materials were used more frugally and often replaced with cheaper, better solutions—all as I’d predicted in 2010. Prices fell accordingly.

### 1NC---Thumper---REMs

#### COVID thumps.

Kim & Karpinski 20, \*Tae-Yoon, MA in Global Energy Management and Policy, World Energy Outlook Analyst. \*\*Milosz, BSc, Staff Project Engineer at Cenovus Energy (IEA, 5-6-2020, "Clean energy progress after the Covid-19 crisis will need reliable supplies of critical minerals", *IEA*, https://www.iea.org/articles/clean-energy-progress-after-the-covid-19-crisis-will-need-reliable-supplies-of-critical-minerals)

As the Covid-19 pandemic has pushed many countries into some form of lockdown and hit mining operations across the globe, the risks around clean energy supply chains, including those of minerals, have come into sharper focus. Peru’s copper-mining activities, which are responsible for 12% of global production, ground to a halt because of the country’s confinement measures. South Africa’s lockdown disrupted 75% of the global output of platinum, a key material in many clean energy technologies and emissions control devices, although the country later allowed mines to operate at 50% capacity. Although prices for many important minerals have fallen as global demand has slumped, recent developments have highlighted a number of reasons why the world should not take secure supplies for granted.

#### Governments thump---so do steel tensions. [KU is blue]

1AC Preston 14 - (\*Jaakko Kooroshy \*\*Felix Preston and \*\*\*Siân Bradley \*Head of Data & Methodologies & Sustainable Investing @ FTSE Russell, Research Fellow @ Chatham House, Executive Director @ Goldman Sachs \*\*senior research fellow and deputy research director in the Energy, Environment and Resources Department @ Chatham House \*\*\*Senior Research Fellow in the Energy, Environment and Resources Department @ Chatham House; December 2014, Chatham House, The Royal Institute for International Affairs, " Cartels and Competition in Minerals Markets: Challenges for Global Governance," doa: 6-9-2021) url: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field\_document/20141219CartelsCompetitionMineralsMarketsKooroshyPrestonBradleyFinal.pdf

Maintaining open, orderly and well-functioning global metals and minerals markets remains a major challenge for global resource governance. Despite the demise of formal collusive arrangements, the threat of attempts by producer governments and companies to increase prices, restrict supplies or carve up markets remains real. State-backed private cartels that restrict supplies in potash markets, the questionable warehousing practices on the LME that affect the price of aluminium, and the 2014 price spike in nickel caused by contentious Indonesian export restrictions are three recent examples.

With complex global supply chains and blurred boundaries between physical and financial markets, the threat has shifted from producer-country cartels to much more subtle, yet potentially equally damaging practices. Opaque pricing mechanisms and weakly governed market platforms are vulnerable to manipulation by powerful market participants, including trading houses, major producers and financial institutions. The ongoing debates and litigation around the manipulation of pricing mechanisms for precious metals demonstrate this point.

Combating such practices is an urgent task for policy-makers, not only to avert the substantial adverse economic impacts of these distortions, but also to prevent the international tensions to which they can give rise. The effects of market distortions and disruptions for metals and minerals are publicly much less visible than those for other key resources such as fossil fuels or agricultural products. But the limited evidence that is available points to billions of dollars in damages to consuming industries, which eventually are passed down supply chains. In many cases market distortions can also contribute to bilateral tensions or trigger acrimonious trade disputes.

While the different types of anti-competitive practices have similar impacts – higher prices for consumers, supply constraints or market inefficiencies – successful policy responses require a case-bycase approach that takes key actors and specific political economy dynamics into account. The options for responding to export restrictions imposed by sovereign states, for example, look very different from those designed to improve regulation of transnational trading platforms.

In all cases, however, interconnected markets mean that collaboration across borders is key to improve regulation and address distortions. At present mineral markets receive limited attention from many governments, and where governments engage they are often pursuing a narrow national agenda. For example, anti-trust enforcement in metals markets remains piecemeal, and anti-competitive market structures are often only assessed when regulators are required to approve major mergers or acquisitions.

Working together, there are significant opportunities for large consuming countries to exert joint leverage in global markets and international institutions to catalyse reform in key areas. Costs and inefficiencies resulting from anti-competitive practices ultimately affect companies and consumers in all countries, but it is the major mineral importers, such as the EU and China, which are worst affected. Enhanced cooperation among these actors would, however, require looking beyond existing raw materials-related trade tensions, particularly around steel and speciality metals such as rare earths.

### 1NC---AT Renewables

#### Capitalist REM extraction wreaks havoc on ecosystems and causes neocolonial resource scrambles.

Hickel 19, PhD, Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, Senior Lecturer at Goldsmiths, University of London. (Jason, 5-6-2019, "The Limits of Clean Energy", *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/06/the-path-to-clean-energy-will-be-very-dirty-climate-change-renewables/>)

We need a rapid transition to renewables, yes—but scientists warn that we can’t keep growing energy use at existing rates. No energy is innocent. The only truly clean energy is less energy. In 2017, the World Bank released a little-noticed report that offered the first comprehensive look at this question. It models the increase in material extraction that would be required to build enough solar and wind utilities to produce an annual output of about 7 terawatts of electricity by 2050. That’s enough to power roughly half of the global economy. By doubling the World Bank figures, we can estimate what it will take to get all the way to zero emissions—and the results are staggering: 34 million metric tons of copper, 40 million tons of lead, 50 million tons of zinc, 162 million tons of aluminum, and no less than 4.8 billion tons of iron. In some cases, the transition to renewables will require a massive increase over existing levels of extraction. For neodymium—an essential element in wind turbines—extraction will need to rise by nearly 35 percent over current levels. Higher-end estimates reported by the World Bank suggest it could double. The same is true of silver, which is critical to solar panels. Silver extraction will go up 38 percent and perhaps as much as 105 percent. Demand for indium, also essential to solar technology, will more than triple and could end up skyrocketing by 920 percent. And then there are all the batteries we’re going to need for power storage. To keep energy flowing when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing will require enormous batteries at the grid level. This means 40 million tons of lithium—an eye-watering 2,700 percent increase over current levels of extraction. That’s just for electricity. We also need to think about vehicles. This year, a group of leading British scientists submitted a letter to the U.K. Committee on Climate Change outlining their concerns about the ecological impact of electric cars. They agree, of course, that we need to end the sale and use of combustion engines. But they pointed out that unless consumption habits change, replacing the world’s projected fleet of 2 billion vehicles is going to require an explosive increase in mining: Global annual extraction of neodymium and dysprosium will go up by another 70 percent, annual extraction of copper will need to more than double, and cobalt will need to increase by a factor of almost four—all for the entire period from now to 2050. The problem here is not that we’re going to run out of key minerals—although that may indeed become a concern. The real issue is that this will exacerbate an already existing crisis of overextraction. Mining has become one of the biggest single drivers of deforestation, ecosystem collapse, and biodiversity loss around the world. Ecologists estimate that even at present rates of global material use, we are overshooting sustainable levels by 82 percent. Take silver, for instance. Mexico is home to the Peñasquito mine, one of the biggest silver mines in the world. Covering nearly 40 square miles, the operation is staggering in its scale: a sprawling open-pit complex ripped into the mountains, flanked by two waste dumps each a mile long, and a tailings dam full of toxic sludge held back by a wall that’s 7 miles around and as high as a 50-story skyscraper. This mine will produce 11,000 tons of silver in 10 years before its reserves, the biggest in the world, are gone. To transition the global economy to renewables, we need to commission up to 130 more mines on the scale of Peñasquito. Just for silver. Lithium is another ecological disaster. It takes 500,000 gallons of water to produce a single ton of lithium. Even at present levels of extraction this is causing problems. In the Andes, where most of the world’s lithium is located, mining companies are burning through the water tables and leaving farmers with nothing to irrigate their crops. Many have had no choice but to abandon their land altogether. Meanwhile, chemical leaks from lithium mines have poisoned rivers from Chile to Argentina, Nevada to Tibet, killing off whole freshwater ecosystems. The lithium boom has barely even started, and it’s already a crisis. And all of this is just to power the existing global economy. Things become even more extreme when we start accounting for growth. As energy demand continues to rise, material extraction for renewables will become all the more aggressive—and the higher the growth rate, the worse it will get. It’s important to keep in mind that most of the key materials for the energy transition are located in the global south. Parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia will likely become the target of a new scramble for resources, and some countries may become victims of new forms of colonization. It happened in the 17th and 18th centuries with the hunt for gold and silver from South America. In the 19th century, it was land for cotton and sugar plantations in the Caribbean. In the 20th century, it was diamonds from South Africa, cobalt from Congo, and oil from the Middle East. It’s not difficult to imagine that the scramble for renewables might become similarly violent. If we don’t take precautions, clean energy firms could become as destructive as fossil fuel companies—buying off politicians, trashing ecosystems, lobbying against environmental regulations, even assassinating community leaders who stand in their way.

## ADV: OUTREACH

### 1NC---ASEAN

#### ASEAN only achieves development by exploiting the periphery---causes economic inequality and exploitation.

San Juan 18, De La Salle University (David Michael Marcelino San Juan, February 2018, “A Better World is Possible: A Marxist Critique of ASEAN Integration, 11th De La Salle University Arts Congress, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322951417\_A\_Better\_World\_is\_Possible\_A\_Marxist\_Critique\_of\_ASEAN\_Integration)

3. POVERTY, INCOME GAPS AND EXPLOITATION UNDER CAPITALIST GLOBALIZATION

ASEAN’s subscription to capitalism is evident in the huge gap between the richest and the poorest segments of its population, as proven by online World Bank data (2017) on income shares. In the Philippines (2015), the richest 10% control 31.3% of the national income, while the poorest 10% got only 2.7% of the national income. There’s no recent data in Singapore but economists estimate that “10-14 percent of Singaporeans still face severe financial problems and have difficulties meeting basic needs” (Shuzhen, 2017), in a country of 21 billionaires as of 2016 (Lin, 2017). Rich corporations and their wealthy owners monopolize the wealth produced by exploited workers. In the Philippines, the more than decade-old demand of workers for a 125-peso across-the-board legislated wage hike remains unheard, despite the fact that “…for some 35,000 firms with 3.9 million employees,” such wage hike “…is only 12.3% of their profits and will still leave establishments with Php1.38 trillion in profits” in a year (IBON Databank, 2016). The daily minimum wage in the Philippines’ National Capital Region is just 512 pesos as of October 5, 2017 – an amount worth just almost 4 Big Mac ala carte. Hence, the typical fastfood worker starts working to enrich his/her master after he/she has sold his/her fourth big hamburger. No wonder, fastfood giants in the Philippines consistently reap big profits yearly. Karl Marx’s theory on surplus value and labor exploitation remains relevant. The rate of exploitation, the rate of the accumulation of surplus value varies in every country but exploitation exists everywhere. This is a ~~dog-eat-dog world~~, where the richest and those who want to get rich prey upon others, like in the Singaporean movie “Unlucky Plaza” (Kwek, 2014) – where a sneaky pastor doubling as a real estate scammer victimizes a really “unlucky” Filipino migrant – or in the Philippine movie “Oro” (Yapan, 2016) – where small-scale miners are extrajudicially killed for refusing to let a political dynasty’s minion monopolize gold resources in their island.

Thus, even the seemingly meek leader of the Roman Catholic Church Pope Francis (2015) called capitalism as “the dung of the devil,” condemned the “unfettered pursuit of money” and urged everyone to reflect by asking “Do we truly realize that something is wrong in a world where there are so many farmworkers without land, so many families without a home, so many laborers without rights, so many persons whose dignity is not respected?” Furthermore, he railed against “Colonialism, both old and new, which reduces poor countries to mere providers of raw material and cheap labor, engenders violence, poverty, forced migrations…precisely because, by placing the periphery at the service of the center, it denies those countries the right to an integral development.” This is where trouble brews for ASEAN integration: it runs the risk of perpetuating such old and new forms of colonialism, as free trade – the main element of integration – is a zero-sum game where winners of globalization gain at the expense of the losers. Within the lopsided framework of neoliberal globalization, the global economic system is more favorable to developed/capital-rich countries because 1) developed nations’ investments in developing countries earn profits which the former typically repatriate, rather than reinvest in the latter; 2) developed countries control multilateral financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and even the biggest private banks that are capable of bankrolling or frustrating any effort towards industrialization contemplated by progressive developing countries’ governments; 3) technology transfers on a massive scale seldom happens, hence developed countries tend to retain a monopoly on innovations vital to the growth of the manufacturing sector; 4) the bulk price of the developing countries’ main exports (raw materials and semimanufactured goods) is lower than the bulk price of their typical imports from developed countries (technology/ machinery and high-value products); 5) the migration of workers and professionals from developing countries to the developed countries depletes the former’s human resources which they need to free themselves from poverty and dependency; and 6) the education system of developing countries is aligned with the needs of developed/capitalrich countries which are also typical destinations of migrant workers from the developing nations (San Juan, 2016).

4. LEARNING FROM EUROPE: TOWARDS A NEW ASEAN

Capitalists in almost all ASEAN member states wholeheartedly embrace economic integration. Filipino billionaire Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala (2018) praised ASEAN integration as it purportedly “…encouraged intra regional investment, trade, labor mobility, and overall ease of doing business.” Nevertheless, Zobel de Ayala admitted that because “globalization encourages the most efficient allocation of resources; including labor, capital, and land…it has created both winners and losers in the process. Skilled workers in developed economies have suffered the most from the off-shoring of jobs to more cost-competitive markets like ours.” This is where proponents and critics of capitalism differs: the former – like Zobel de Ayala – think that mere “reskilling” or “upskilling” of displaced workers will solve the problem and insulate capitalism from future systemic failures; the latter assert that state-led income redistribution is needed to address inequalities as corporations and the world’s elite don’t even pay the correct taxes as recent media exposes – such as the so-called Paradise Papers and Panama Papers – reveal. With regard to reskilling, in the Philippine case, even after the implementation of the K to 12 scheme as a way to reskill Filipinos in preparation for full-blast ASEAN integration (San Juan, 2016), big businessmen still claim that the first graduates of that scheme (which they loudly support) “may not be work-ready” (ABS-CBN News, 2018).

Capitalists claim that their version of economic integration will benefit everyone, but even Ostry et al.’s International Monetary Fund-financed research (2016) admits that “(i)nstead of delivering growth, some neoliberal policies have increased inequality, in turn jeopardizing durable expansion.” Some neoliberal ideologues still mouth the trickle-down mantra, but the realities of economic integration can be revealed if earlier cases are scrutinized. From its inception, any economic integration scheme will have its hegemon – the core, and consequently, its peripheries. In the European Union, the economies of stronger industrial countries – led by Germany – grew primarily at the expense of their weaker counterparts such as Greece. As per World Bank statistics, the Greek manufacturing sector’s contribution to the GDP was 11.2% in 2001 (the year it adopted the euro), registering steadily decline until 2006, reaching a record-low 8.19% in 2010, and recovering to 9.14% in 2015, yet still below the pre-euro membership peak of 12.1% in 1995. Not surprisingly, the German manufacturing sector’s contribution to the GDP registered steady increases from 2002-2007 (22.1% to 23.4%). Germany’s trade surplus with Greece (or Greece’s trade deficit with Germany) continuously widened throughout the Euro era (Washington Post, 2010). Simply put, Germany gained at the expense of Greece. Even the United Kingdom – prior to Brexit – was running a big trade deficit with the rest of the European Union (Fullfact, 2017), and – more specifically, as in the case of Greece – with Germany. Hence, the Brexiteers’ complaint of being losers under the EU is partly true. Whatever way you graph it, there’s no denying: not everyone can be winners in the current version of globalization. It must be noted that despite Germany’s success as an exporter in the EU, its “relative poverty rate” has also been rising in the past years; it has the “lowest home ownership rate in the EU”; and the income gap “between the poorest 10 per cent of Germans and the richest tenth started widening in the mid-1990s” (Wagstyl, 2017).

The EU’s situation is a mirror of what ASEAN in the next few years may look like. Economic integration pits the strongest economies against the weakest ones. Using ASEAN trade aggregates as basis (Tables 5.5 and 5.7 in ASEAN Secretariat, 2017) – Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are the regional hegemons. On intra-ASEAN import and export, only Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand registered positive trade balances (more exports than imports), while the rest of the ASEAN registered negative trade balances (more imports than exports) for a number of years, with Cambodia, Laos, Viet Nam and the Philippines registering negative statistics for the whole 10-year period. These negative trade balances of weak economies can be only be reversed if they will be able to innovate and catch up with stronger economies – and that means that they’ll have to outperform other countries in a race where they started as the laggards.

As the Greek economy’s fortunes under the EU tell us, catching up is almost impossible within a free trade zone, especially if the economies involved have started with already wide trade gaps and gaps in other fields such as education and innovation. In the ASEAN, Singapore leads in the Global Innovation Index (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2017) and with the World University Rankings 2018 too – having two universities in the top 100 (Times Higher Education, 2018), a feat which other Southeast Asian countries is yet to replicate. In the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI) that covers data on infrastructure and international shipments, regional trade hegemons Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand are ranked above regional trade laggards Philippines, Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam in both 2007 and 2016 . Peripheral countries of the ASEAN can also try keeping their wage rates very low to make their export sectors more competitive – but that will be very difficult if not impossible as these countries have low wage rates to begin with (National Wages and Productivity Commission, 2017).

But there is a better way to do things. A better world is possible, as progressives say. Integration could be steered away from the credo of greed, profit-first mentality and zerosum games. The imminent threat of extreme climate change to our region and the world all the more necessitates cooperation, rather than competition. A more sustainable allocation of resources can only be possible through international cooperation and a paradigm shift away from the prioritization of profit. ASEAN can take a cue from non-neoliberal transnational formations such as the World Social Forum (Fisher and Ponniah, 2015), Alianza Bolivariana de las Américas/ALBA (2015) and International League of Peoples’ Struggles/ILPS (2015). These formations offer short-term, medium-term, and long-term policy prescriptions from the abandonment of austerity to a “solidarity economy,” an economy that focuses on common needs.

A progressive ASEAN project can prioritize full-blast research on and utilization of renewable energy for continuous macroeconomic development with negligible environmental impact; institute transnational tax reform and establish a “solidarity fund” to redistribute wealth; and initiate transnational cooperation on managed migration to help poorer countries and lessen the burden of adaptation and resettlement in an era of extreme climate change. Pooling of resources for such common goals is imperative, similar to what the participating countries in the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia (1955) envisioned “to provide technical assistance to one another, to the maximum extent practicable, in the form of: experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment for demonstration purposes; exchange of know-how and establishment of national, and where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting knowledge and skills in cooperatoon with the existing international agencies.” A 21st century version of such optimistic transnational cooperation is outlined in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech at the Asian-African Summit 2015 (if only words are matched with action)

Harnessing and maximizing renewable energy, coupled with developments in robotics can usher an era where people will work shorter hours for higher pay (Mason, 2016), as the increase in productivity leads to an increase of profits. Funding for shorter hours for higher pay needs to be charged against the gains of automation. Transnational tax reform will ensure that gains realized from technological advances can be socialized for the common good rather than monopolized by the few. Now, more than ever, there’s consensus on the need for international tax reform – reformists such as the economist Thomas Piketty and revolutionaries who subscribe to Karl Marx’s and Friedrich Engels’ call for progressive taxation in the “Manifesto of the Communist Party” (1848) agree that taxes for the wealthiest need to be raised now, not reduced. The global race-to-the-bottom in taxes should be ended if wealth is to be redistributed in a more egalitarian way.

Winners of globalization should contribute to building a solidarity fund that will redistribute wealth by funding development projects in the countries where there are many “losers.” This is a world where the strong will help, rather than trample the weak, where “none shall push aside another, none shall let another fall,” as Pete Seeger’s version of “Ode to Joy” says. Presently, the ASEAN Fund is the only feasible mechanism for a regional version of solidarity fund for peripheral countries, albeit ASEAN member nations contribute equally, rather than equitably. Singapore could be persuaded to provide a larger contribution to the said fund. As the top intra-ASEAN trade surplus maker, Singapore can also easily match Malaysia’s initial $150-million equity contribution to the Asian Development Bank/ADB-backed ASEAN Infrastructure Fund (Table 1 in ADB, c.2011) as a way to help trade laggards catch up. Loans from such funds should be interest- and conditionalities-free, so that debtors won’t be mired in the debt trap. Finally, to help the poorer countries – often the most vulnerable to climate change too – transnational cooperation on managed migration could be practiced. Developed countries should take in more migrants from climate changevulnerable countries or at least help fund the in-country resettlement of climate change victims. This is a matter of justice as it is proven that high-income and industrialized countries have contributed more to carbon emissions – especially if historical and current figures are combined (Saran, 2015).

5. CONCLUSION

Capitalism can’t be the world’s future because its continuation only brings the Earth nearer to the Apocalypse. A radical paradigm shift – from profit motive to people- and Earthcenteredness, from endless macroeconomic growth and elite wealth accumulation to sustainable development and wealth redistribution, from strengthening corporations to empowering communities – is all that it takes to change the world. A better world is possible and realizable, if only people are ready to transform their definition of what is possible, if only citizens realize that utopias are buildable, if only people will get the simple point spoken more than a century ago by a ~~man~~ (Marx, 1845) whose bicentennial is celebrated this year by dreamers and builders alike: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.” A fitting year for Southeast Asian citizens to start transforming the ASEAN.

### 1NC---!D---China War

#### No US-China war

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In recent years, a radical overcorrection appears to have taken place among many American scholars and policymakers, exemplified by Allison [1], who have expressed increasingly confident beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile to the US [5, 15, 19, 39, 58]. These beliefs are especially pronounced within the Trump administration, but have now also been expressed many foreign policymakers from previous administrations and more traditional experts on US-China relations.

This confident pessimism has two sources, neither of which is well-founded. The first is categorical assumptions about the behavior of rising states or authoritarian states in general. Many realist scholars assume that China’s intentions are hostile to US interests because the anarchic nature of the international system engenders inexorable zero-sum competition for power [40, 46], a logically-untenable claim that has been roundly refuted.12 Others assume that divergences in American and Chinese political values and regime types necessarily imply incompatible preferences for the international order at the systemic level [1, 17, 48, 52]. Yet as has been widely recognized, these particular variables are themselves indeterminate, and interact with many other domestic-level factors to determine China’s aggregate national preferences for the international order ([12, 41]:521; [60]:44). Indeed, China may very well (though not necessarily) prefer to maintain the status quo order from which it has so overwhelmingly benefitted ([7, 8]:xix; [26, 55, 56]).

Secondly, other observers have extrapolated from China’s increased “assertiveness” on regional territorial issues since 2009 to conclude that China’s intentions are broadly revisionist across all issue areas [5, 63]. The apparent rationale is that because China had previously exhibited cooperative behavior regarding the SCS and restraint toward Taiwan that its cooperation with the international economic order must similarly be misrepresenting its true goals [18, 43, 50]. As such, an increasingly common conclusion is that China’s initiation of new regional institutions such as the AIIB and BRI and its state-led industrial policies, large current-account surplus, sovereign lending, and expanding FDI are evidence of its preference for a less liberalized international economic order.13

This conclusion is unwarranted, however. Although the scholarly consensus now holds that China was previously misrepresenting its true goals on narrow regional territorial issues, China has yet to exhibit clearly revisionist behavior regarding the rules and norms of the liberal international order more generally, even as it has become more powerful [8, 47, 55, 57, 60, 62]. As Alastair Iain Johnston has convincingly argued, China’s “assertive turn” is almost entirely limited to the South China Sea,

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and does not extend to the broader international order: “one should be cautious about generalizing from these maritime disputes to Chinese foreign policy writ large...it is possible for a state to be newly assertive on some limited range of issues while leaving other major policies unchanged” ([31]:46). Furthermore, Christensen points out that even when China’s actions are noncooperative – e.g., by gaining advantageous financing from Chinese state-owned banks for foreign energy deals, stealing intellectual property, computer hacking, or “dumping” exports to gain market share – this does not constitute rewriting the existing rules of the international order. “It simply constitutes free-riding on existing rules, an entirely different kettle of fish” ([8]:57).

In short, in some issue areas – human rights policy and specific regional territorial issues in East Asia – the US and China clearly have real conflicts of interests. Yet this does not give us insights into the compatibility of US and Chinese interests on other issues, e.g., the global economic order and governing structure. On the latter issues, the goals of two countries might very well be more compatible. The likelihood of this depends on the credibility of China’s cooperative signals in these issue areas, which, in turn, depends in part on the degree of US hedging toward China.

Particularly in the economic realm, China has sustained and even increased its support for the rules and institutions that define the status quo order, continuing to champion economic liberalization even as American leadership has wavered under President Donald Trump. China’s institutional initiatives, such as the AIIB and BRI, as well as its increased influence in existing institutions, have so far served to augment the existing rules and norms of the U.S.-led order rather than challenge them. Furthermore, China has continued to pursue domestic economic reforms that would increase its cooperation regarding trade imbalances, intellectual property and cybersecurity [10, 11, 24, 49]. Again, this cooperation certainly does not imply that China’s long-term intentions are unambiguously benign on these issues – strong incentives to misrepresent have still obtained, particularly in the absence of US hedging – but in contrast to the territorial issues that are the subject of China’s “assertive turn”, China’s intentions on economic and institutional issues remain significantly uncertain.

Disturbingly, the Trump administration has overtly drawn on the flawed assumptions characterized above and expressed confident beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile. According to the 2017 US National Security Strategy, China is a “revisionist power” that “want[s] to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests...seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor” and is “attempting to erode American security and prosperity” [64].14 Several of Trump’s most prominent foreign policy and economic advisers have written extensively on China’s hostility, cast China as the primary threat to US national security and economic wellbeing, and characterized war with China as inevitable and perhaps even desirable [39, 48, 51]. Correspondingly, the administration has begun to implement policies of economic containment toward China, levelling over 200 billion dollars of tariffs on Chinese imports (and counting), blocking Chinese FDI in the United States, and demanding that China increase imports of US goods to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance to specific thresholds.

Ironically, the Trump administration’s hedging strategy now lends considerable (though incomplete) credibility to China’s sustained economic and institutional cooperation. Yet that very hedging strategy is likely driven by unjustified and inflexible pessimism about China’s intentions, making it unlikely that the current leadership will draw appropriate lessons from China’s subsequent behavioral signals. To the extent that China continues to defend and advocate a rules-based liberal economic order in the face of Trump’s economic hedging, this constitutes a more credible signal of China’s benign intentions than did its previous cooperation under unconditional US accommodation.

Unfortunately, the Trump administration’s apparent confidence about China’s hostility, based on seriously flawed assumptions, does not portend that the current leadership is likely to positively update its beliefs should China continue its general cooperation within the existing international order. Nor does Trump’s narcissistic psychological profile or the track record of his administration, which has consistently twisted evidence to support preconceived beliefs and suppressed contrary opinions [44]. Thus, current US foreign policy turns the logic of hedging on its head: rather than hedging due to uncertainty, policymakers have assumed China’s hostility and adopted policies of containment in response. This implies that if the Thucydides trap produces preventive war between the US and a hypothetically benign China, it will not be due to rational uncertainty, but rather because American leaders fail to rationally update their beliefs in response to China’s cooperative signals and instead falsely assume China’s intentions to be hostile.

# 2NC

## KRITIK

### 2NC---Overview

#### 3---wars of accumulation---they trigger great-power conflict and turn the case

Burden-Stelly 20, Assistant Professor of Africana Studies and Political Science @ Carleton. (Charisse, 7-1-2020, "Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism: Some Theoretical Insights", *Monthly Review*, <https://monthlyreview.org/2020/07/01/modern-u-s-racial-capitalism/>)

In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism.

War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat.

Here, Du Bois’s 1915 essay, “The African Roots of War,” is instructive.34 Though he does not directly analyze the United States, he nonetheless demonstrates how racism, white supremacy, and the plunder of Africa underpinned the capitalist imperialist war that engulfed the world from July 1914 to November 1918—a war that catapulted the United States into the center of the capitalist world system. Using Du Bois’s own words, Hubert Harrison, the father of Harlem radicalism, makes the direct link:

But since every industrial nation is seeking the same outlet for its products, clashes are inevitable and in these clashes beaks and claws—armies and navies—must come into play. Hence beaks and claws must be provided beforehand against the day of conflict, and hence the exploitation of white men in Europe and America becomes the reason for the exploitation of black and brown and yellow men in African and Asia. And, therefore, it is hypocritical and absurd to pretend that the capitalist nations can ever intend to abolish wars.… For white folk to insist upon the right to manage their own ancestral lands, free from the domination of tyrants, domestic and foreign, is variously described as “democracy” and “self-determination.” For Negroes, Egyptians and Hindus to seek the same thing is impudence.… Truly has it been said that “the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the ‘Color Line.'” And wars are not likely to end; in fact, they are likely to be wider and more terrible—so long as this theory of white domination seeks to hold down the majority of the world’s people under the iron heel of racial oppression.35

### 2AC [1]---AT Cap Solves Everything

#### New link: “World getting better” is a façade premised on ignoring racial violence, which their ev doesn’t answer.

Vasudevan & Smith 20, \*Pavithra, Assistant Professor with the Department of African & African Diaspora Studies and the Center for Women's & Gender Studies @ the University of Texas at Austin. \*\*Sara, Associate Professor Department of Geography @ the University of North Carolina. (“The domestic geopolitics of racial capitalism”, *EPC: Politics and Space*, Vol. 38(7-8), pg. 1160-1162, https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654420901567)

Roberta Simpson1 lives in West Badin, North Carolina. Roberta worked for Alcoa, Inc. (formerly, the Aluminum Company of America) in their Badin smelting plant from 1976 to 2003. Working at Alcoa was an inheritance of danger and discrimination:

My daddy had seven children that he had to feed ... He spent 44 years down there. They never gave my father a mask. The whites had the best jobs. There was a thing down there called a bull gang. That was the slang term for that nasty job. I never knew what my daddy had to go through until I was hired ... And I, too, started in the bull gang. You’re setting a big, black carbon. It weighs over a ton. And runnin’ fire. I never seen runnin’ fire in all the days of my life. And it was so hot! The women had to protect their bodies. We would get burned.

Capitalism is predicated upon a racialized hierarchy of gendered bodies and accompanying racialization of space: a heavily polluting aluminum smelting plant, crucial to US 20thcentury industrialization, employed Black laborers in the most physically demanding and hazardous jobs and dumped lethal industrial waste adjacent to the Black residential area. Roberta has struggled to keep herself and her community alive. Whether fighting for safety measures and dignity in the workplace, or for government accountability and hazardous waste remediation outside of work, survival has involved constant strategizing of how to leverage limited power against the impossible odds of an uncaring government colluding with a multinational giant. For communities of color living in capitalism’s toxic “sacrifice zones” (Lerner, 2012), “life’s work,” the gendered labor of social reproduction (Mitchell et al., 2004), is characterized by daily negotiations with death-dealing structures that complicate, and exceed, the already challenging demands of obtaining food, maintaining a household, and sustaining community networks.

Meanwhile, in Flint, Michigan, four years after news broke of widespread lead poisoning, children’s safety remains a concern for caregivers wrestling with conflicting information from government officials and scientists. In 2016, eight-year-old Mari Copeny, “Little Miss Flint,” wrote to then-President Obama, asking him to visit. Copeny and her mother, Lulu Brezzell, have raised over $350,000 through donations and fundraisers to provide residents bottled water (Suggs, 2019). Their activism makes visible the often-hidden labor of survival in zones of “organized abandonment” (Gilmore, 2008)— the uncelebrated, mundane, and tedious work of hauling, unwrapping, and distributing water, reading reports, attending hearings, navigating broken trust and frustration, considering flight, and enduring.

Despite unique histories, rooted in the South and the Rust Belt respectively, Badin and Flint share characteristics that are tragically common among predominantly Black communities in the US: a greater likelihood of premature death (Gilmore, 2002), due in part to the racialized concentration of lethal industrial waste, reflecting state neglect and collusion with industry (Holifield, 2001; Taylor, 2014). Environmental racism is a constitutive element of “racial capitalism,” a Black radical theorization of how capitalism develops through the proliferation of social hierarchies based in the devaluation of racialized people (Gilmore, 2002; Pulido, 2016; Robinson, 2000). Racially disproportionate exposure to toxicity is a material manifestation of capitalism’s “slow violence” (Nixon, 2011), which erodes the environmental conditions sustaining life. However, Badin’s sacrifice and Flint’s abandonment are neither incidental nor accidental. Racial zones of toxicity and abandonment are the shadow geographies of empire. Celebrated for their productivity during industrialization, their subsequent economic decline and rising concerns about contamination reflect a process of ruination (Stoler, 2008) that we argue is symptomatic of a colonial relationship with the US imperial state. Rendered materially and symbolically surplus, these territories are erased from national imaginaries of progress; such sites of production that have been sacrificed for the so-called “national good” point to the ways that “imperialism as a way of life [animates] the architecture of sociopolitical relations at home as well as abroad” (Sundberg, 2015: 210). Yet life endures in the shadows of empire.

We draw on the analytic framework of “Black geographies” (McKittrick and Woods, 2007) to examine social reproductive labor in Badin and Flint. Black geographies illuminate how Black people’s experiences and knowledges are cartographically and systematically marginalized, despite their centrality to the uneven development of capitalist modernity, rendered “as invisible/forgettable, at the same time as the invisible/forgettable is producing space” (McKittrick and Woods, 2007: 4). Chattel slavery’s illogic, equating Blackness with non-humanity, is perpetuated in contemporary capitalism, “[casting] Black geographies as empty and threatening, open to occupation, and subject to surveillance and assault” (Bledsoe and Wright, 2018: 4). The association of Black geographies with waste (Wright, 2018) enables iterative processes of capitalist accumulation through technologies of development, dispossession, and debt (Harris, 2019). However, rather than merely reiterating anti-Black material violence and erasure, the Black geographies analytic reimagines sociospatial relations through Black lived experiences. Following McKittrick’s invitation to conceptualize Black geographies beyond the colonial plantation logics that structure them, we understand scenes of Black suffering not as a catalog of death but of “the struggle against death” (McKittrick, 2013: 14). In Badin and Flint, surviving colonization demands a dizzying range of labor: bearing witness to premature deaths; learning scientific language to explain inexplicable harm; and assuming responsibility for community welfare. Such practices to sustain life and enable futurity in necropolitical conditions constitute a geopolitical praxis: strategies engaged by domestic populations to defend their bodies, homes, and communities from the unspectacular, yet insistent, everyday onslaught of an imperial state.

We propose the term domestic geopolitics to describe a reconceived feminist geopolitics integrating an analysis of US anti-Black racism as a form of “internal colonialism” (Hamilton and Ture, 1992/1967), with an expanded understanding of Black women’s social reproduction in “the afterlife of slavery” (Hartman, 2007: 6) as political work (Hartman, 2016; James, 1997; Sharpe, 2016). Our conceptualization of domestic geopolitics integrates the dual meanings of domestic: governance within a state’s territorial bounds and the intimate sphere of social life that constitutes the home, family, and community. In developing the concept of domestic geopolitics, we first outline why internal colonialism is significant for understanding Black relations with the US state in general and its specific relevance to racialized toxicity. We then review feminist scholarship on social reproduction, centering Black women’s labor to redefine the domestic as a sphere of political praxis. Domestic geopolitics is the political work undertaken by racialized peoples living within imperial states, whose strategies of survival are a refusal of their structurally consigned disposability; the labor of caring for and preserving life in such necropolitical conditions is a matter of “self-preservation, and this an act of political warfare” (Lorde, 1988: 131). By drawing attention to the domesticity of geopolitics, we suggest that the operations of and resistance to internal colonialism are intimately entangled in global empire; it is the forgetting of these intimacies of empire that enables a deceptive façade of liberal humanism retrenching colonial divisions of humanity (Lowe, 2015).

#### Poverty is increasing because of capitalism.

Hickel 19, An academic at the University of London and a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts (Jason, January 29th, “Bill Gates says poverty is decreasing. He couldn’t be more wrong,” *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/29/bill-gates-davos-global-poverty-infographic-neoliberal>, Accessed 07-12-2021)

There are a number of problems with this graph, though. First of all, real data on poverty has only been collected since 1981. Anything before that is extremely sketchy, and to go back as far as 1820 is meaningless. Roser draws on a dataset that was never intended to describe poverty, but rather inequality in the distribution of world GDP – and that for only a limited range of countries. There is no actual research to bolster the claims about long-term poverty. It’s not science; it’s social media.

What Roser’s numbers actually reveal is that the world went from a situation where most of humanity had no need of money at all to one where today most of humanity struggles to survive on extremely small amounts of money. The graph casts this as a decline in poverty, but in reality what was going on was a process of dispossession that bulldozed people into the capitalist labour system, during the enclosure movements in Europe and the colonisation of the global south.

Prior to colonisation, most people lived in subsistence economies where they enjoyed access to abundant commons – land, water, forests, livestock and robust systems of sharing and reciprocity. They had little if any money, but then they didn’t need it in order to live well – so it makes little sense to claim that they were poor. This way of life was violently destroyed by colonisers who forced people off the land and into European-owned mines, factories and plantations, where they were paid paltry wages for work they never wanted to do in the first place.

In other words, Roser’s graph illustrates a story of coerced proletarianisation. It is not at all clear that this represents an improvement in people’s lives, as in most cases we know that the new income people earned from wages didn’t come anywhere close to compensating for their loss of land and resources, which were of course gobbled up by colonisers. Gates’s favourite infographic takes the violence of colonisation and repackages it as a happy story of progress.

But that’s not all that’s wrong here. The trend that the graph depicts is based on a poverty line of $1.90 (£1.44) per day, which is the equivalent of what $1.90 could buy in the US in 2011. It’s obscenely low by any standard, and we now have piles of evidence that people living just above this line have terrible levels of malnutrition and mortality. Earning $2 per day doesn’t mean that you’re somehow suddenly free of extreme poverty. Not by a long shot.

Scholars have been calling for a more reasonable poverty line for many years. Most agree that people need a minimum of about $7.40 per day to achieve basic nutrition and normal human life expectancy, plus a half-decent chance of seeing their kids survive their fifth birthday. And many scholars, including Harvard economist Lant Pritchett, insist that the poverty line should be set even higher, at $10 to $15 per day.

So what happens if we measure global poverty at the low end of this more realistic spectrum – $7.40 per day, to be extra conservative? Well, we see that the number of people living under this line has increased dramatically since measurements began in 1981, reaching some 4.2 billion people today. Suddenly the happy Davos narrative melts away.

Moreover, the few gains that have been made have virtually all happened in one place: China. It is disingenuous, then, for the likes of Gates and Pinker to claim these gains as victories for Washington-consensus neoliberalism. Take China out of the equation, and the numbers look even worse. Over the four decades since 1981, not only has the number of people in poverty gone up, the proportion of people in poverty has remained stagnant at about 60%. It would be difficult to overstate the suffering that these numbers represent.

This is a ringing indictment of our global economic system, which is failing the vast majority of humanity. Our world is richer than ever before, but virtually all of it is being captured by a small elite. Only 5% of all new income from global growth trickles down to the poorest 60% – and yet they are the people who produce most of the food and goods that the world consumes, toiling away in those factories, plantations and mines to which they were condemned 200 years ago. It is madness – and no amount of mansplaining from billionaires will be adequate to justify it.

### 2AC [4]---Decline -> War

#### No correlation between economic decline and war.

Walt 20, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (Stephen M., 5/13/20, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/)

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”   
Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

### 2AC [5]---AT Cap Solves Environment

#### 2---climate apartheid---capitalist “solutions” to warming will leave the Global South to die.

HRC 19, United Nations Human Rights Council (“Climate change and poverty,” *Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights*, <https://srpovertyorg.files.wordpress.com/2019/06/unsr-poverty-climate-change-a_hrc_41_39.pdf>)

50. Rather than helping the world adapt to climate change, privatizing basic services and social protection may be a form of maladaptation. When hurricane Sandy wreaked havoc in New York in 2012, stranding low-income and vulnerable New Yorkers without access to power and healthcare, the Goldman Sachs headquarters was protected by tens of thousands of its own sandbags and power from its generator.114 Private white-glove firefighters have been dispatched to save the mansions of high-end insurance customers from wildfires.115 ``An over-reliance on the private sector could lead to a climate apartheid scenario in which the wealthy pay to escape overheating, hunger, and conflict, while the rest of the world is left to suffer.

#### 3---innovation fails---it’s NOT disruptive.

Parrique et al. 19, \*Timothée Parrique, Centre for Studies and Research in International Development (CERDI), University of \*Clermont Auvergne, France; Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), Stockholm University, Sweden \*Jonathan Barth, ZOE.Institute for Future-Fit Economies, Bonn, Germany \*François Briens, Independent, Informal Research Centre for Human Emancipation (IRCHE) \*Christian Kerschner, Department of Sustainability, Governance, and Methods, MODUL University Vienna, Austria; Department of Environmental Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic \*Alejo Kraus-Polk, University of California, Davis, USA \*Anna Kuokkanen, Lappeenranta-Lahti University of Technology, Lahti, Finland \*Joachim H. Spangenberg, Sustainable Europe Research Institute (SERI Germany), Cologne, Germany; (July 2019, “Decoupling Debunked: Evidence and arguments against green growth as a sole strategy for sustainability”, Accessible at: <https://eeb.org/library/decoupling-debunked/>, pg. 4-5) \*Bullet points removed.

The validity of the green growth discourse relies on the assumption of an absolute, permanent, global, large and fast enough decoupling of economic growth from all critical environmental pressures. The literature reviewed clearly shows that there is no empirical evidence for such a decoupling currently happening. This is the case for materials, energy, water, greenhouse gases, land, water pollutants, and biodiversity loss for which decoupling is either only relative, and/or observed only temporarily, and/or only locally. In most cases, decoupling is relative. When absolute decoupling occurs, it is observed only during rather short periods of time, concerning only certain resources or forms of impact, for specific locations, and with very small rates of mitigation. There are at least seven reasons to be sceptical about the occurrence of sufficient decoupling in the future. Each of them taken individually casts doubt on the possibility for sufficient decoupling and, thus, the feasibility of “green growth.” Considered all together, the hypothesis that decoupling will allow economic growth to continue without a rise in environmental pressures appears highly compromised, if not clearly unrealistic. 1 Rising energy expenditures. When extracting a resource, cheaper options are generally used first, the extraction of remaining stocks then becoming a more resource- and energy-intensive process resulting in an increase in total environmental degradation per unit of resource extracted. 2 Rebound effects. Efficiency improvements are often partly or totally compensated by a reallocation of saved resources and money to either more of the same consumption (e.g. using a fuel-efficient car more often), or other impactful consumptions (e.g. buying plane tickets for remote holidays with the money saved from fuel economies). It can also generate structural changes in the economy that induce higher consumption (e.g. more fuel-efficient cars reinforce a car-based transport system at the expense of greener alternatives, such as public transport and cycling). 3 Problem shifting. Technological solutions to one environmental problem can create new ones and/or exacerbate others. For example, the production of private electric vehicles puts pressure on lithium, copper, and cobalt resources; the production of biofuel raises concerns about land use; while nuclear power generation produces nuclear risks and logistic concerns regarding nuclear waste disposal. 4 The underestimated impact of services. The service economy can only exist on top of the material economy, not instead of it. Services have a significant footprint that often adds to, rather than substitute, that of goods. 5 Limited potential of recycling. Recycling rates are currently low and only slowly increasing, and recycling processes generally still require a significant amount of energy and virgin raw materials. Most importantly, recycling is strictly limited in its ability to provide resources for an expanding material economy. 6 Insufficient and inappropriate technological change. Technological progress is not targeting the factors of production that matter for ecological sustainability and not leading to the type of innovations that reduce environmental pressures; it is not disruptive enough as it fails to displace other undesirable technologies; and it is not in itself fast enough to enable a sufficient decoupling. 7 Cost shifting. What has been observed and termed as decoupling in some local cases was generally only apparent decoupling resulting mostly from an externalisation of environmental impact from high-consumption to low-consumption countries enabled by international trade. Accounting on a footprint basis reveals a much less optimistic picture and casts further doubt on the possibility of a consistent decoupling in the future.

#### 4---aggregate data goes neg.

Hickel 20, Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, Visiting Senior Fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics, and Senior Lecturer at Goldsmiths, University of London. He serves on the Statistical Advisory Panel for the UN Human Development Report 2020, the advisory board of the Green New Deal for Europe, and on the Harvard-Lancet Commission on Reparations and Redistributive Justice. (Dr. Jason Hickel, 10-27-2020, "Degrowth: A response to Branko Milanovic", *Jason Hickel*, <https://www.jasonhickel.org/blog/2017/11/19/why-branko-milanovic-is-wrong-about-de-growth>) \*Note: the url has a different date/title than the article---that’s not a cite mistake, just a website quirk

6. Green growth is not a thing

Milanovic believes that technology will come to our rescue, and make growth “green”. Unfortunately there is a strong consensus against this assumption. We have reviewed the relevant empirical evidence here (“Is green growth possible?”), examining both CO2 emissions and resource use.

Briefly, about CO2, the question is not whether GDP can be decoupled from emissions (we know that it can be), the question is whether this can be done fast enough to stay within safe carbon budgets while growing GDP at the same time. And the answer to this is no. More growth entails more energy use, and more energy use makes it all the more difficult to cover that demand with renewables. The only scenarios that succeed in reducing emissions fast enough to keep us under 1.5 or 2C involve a reduction in resource and energy use (in other words, degrowth). I discuss this in more depth here. This 2020 review examines 835 empirical studies and finds that decoupling alone is not adequate to achieve climate goals; it requires what the authors themselves refer to as “degrowth” scenarios. This paper in Nature Sustainability comes to similar conclusions.

As for resources: resource use continues to rise along with GDP (despite significant efficiency improvements, and a significant shift to services and knowledge as share of GDP), and indeed all existing models indicate that absolute decoupling is unlikely to happen, even under strong policy conditions. See here and here for more.

Ward et al (2016) find that even the most optimistic projections of efficiency improvements yield no absolute decoupling in the medium and long term. The authors state: “this result is a robust rebuttal to the claim of absolute decoupling”; “decoupling of GDP growth from resource use, whether relative or absolute, is at best only temporary. Permanent decoupling (absolute or relative) is impossible… because the efficiency gains are ultimately governed by physical limits.” Schandl et al (2016) find the same thing. Even in their best-case scenario projection, global material consumption still grows steadily. The authors conclude: “Our research shows that while some relative decoupling can be achieved in some scenarios, none would lead to an absolute reduction in energy or materials footprint.”

Our review was published in 2019, and the literature on this has grown since: i.e., here and here… the latter paper reviews 179 studies on decoupling published since 1990 and finds “no evidence of economy-wide, national or international absolute resource decoupling, and no evidence of the kind of decoupling needed for ecological sustainability.” Here is a 2020 meta-analysis of all available data on GDP and resource use, which comes to the same conclusion.

### AT Warming Inevitable

#### We’re approaching the tipping point, but there’s time to avert it

Evers 19 - editor at SPIEGEL's science department

Marco, 12-12-2019, The Time to Save the Climate Is Now, Der Spiegel, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/is-it-too-late-to-save-the-climate-a-1300898.html

There is no longer any doubt: The pace of climate change is accelerating. Of the 20 hottest years measured since records began, 19 have occurred since 2000. The top five were the last five years. Summer 2019 saw a new temperature record set in Germany of 42.6 degrees Celsius (108 degrees Fahrenheit) and 46 degrees in France. Preliminary findings indicate that the world experienced its warmest average temperatures ever during the months of June, July, September and October of this year. Only the El Niño-fueled year of 2016 remains unsurpassed, with temperatures boosted by the natural weather phenomenon that heats up the eastern Pacific every few years. Indeed, 2019 could ultimately beat out 2015 for second place and will definitely exceed 2017, 2018 and, as has been clear for some time, each of the 1,000 years before that. It is, of course, not possible to accurately predict where 2020 will fit in. It is clear, however, that the coming year will once again be marked by extreme weather events such as heat waves, excessive rainfall, thawing of permafrost, glacier melting, tropical storms, forest fires and droughts, even though it remains difficult to attribute a single weather event to climate change. The Greenhouse Age The new Greenhouse Age is dawning irrevocably, and the state of the world is becoming increasingly precarious. In October 2019, global sea levels were at their highest ever since the start of satellite measurements in 1993. The oceans are warmer than ever before, and the ice sheets of Greenland and the ice shelves of West Antarctica have thinned to an even greater extent than predicted. The cause of the highest temperatures in a millennium can be found in the atmosphere. Never before in the past 3 million years has our atmosphere stored as much of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2) as it does right now. Before the Industrial Revolution, the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere remained relatively constant for thousands of years at between 260 and 280 parts per million (ppm). But then, mankind began burning ever-increasing amounts of fossil fuels and the CO2 content of the atmosphere rose. The planet reached a value of 320 ppm in May 1960. On May 9, 2013, that figure crossed the 400-ppm threshold for the first time. And in 2019, the concentration reached its record level of 415.7 ppm. The values decrease slightly from May to September owing to the abundance of plants growing in the Northern Hemisphere in summer that absorb CO2 through photosynthesis. Next spring, though, is sure to set a new record, because despite the Paris Climate Protection Agreement of 2015 and annual climate conferences like the one currently being held in Madrid, global CO2 emissions are still on the rise. After stagnating between 2014 and 2016, they have been growing ever since. This is the shocking truth about the "climate crisis" that the European Parliament and many countries and cities declared in 2019. At least since the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, researchers have been warning that CO2 emissions need to be reduced. But that hasn't happened. On the contrary, annual global CO2 emissions have increased by 60 percent since then. Four years ago in Paris, countries set the goal of limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius by 2100 or, if possible, even 1.5 degrees Celsius. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) calculated one year ago that it is even still theoretically possible to meet the lower of the two targets, but doubts persist about whether it is still feasible politically, economically and in practical terms. The world has already warmed by 1.1 degrees compared to pre-Industrial Revolution levels. The IPCC believes that meeting the 1.5-degree target would require an extremely ambitious effort, requiring that the world halve its CO2 to roughly the level of 1979. And we would have to do so by 2030, just 10 years from now. It would also require that CO2 emissions be further reduced to zero by 2040. For the more realistic 2-degree target, CO2 emissions would have to be reduced by a quarter by 2030. If both targets are missed, the only other possibility for a future with a climate that is still bearable would be for humanity to find a way to artificially extract hundreds of billions of tons of CO2 from the atmosphere at extremely high costs, using large-scale technologies for which there are no guarantees that they will work. 'Nowhere Near on Track' The prospects for reaching the 1.5-degree goal, though, are "on the brink of becoming impossible," researchers warned in the annual "Emissions Gap Report" compiled by the UN Environmental Program and released on Nov. 26. The report takes a look at the CO2 reductions countries should be undertaking with those that they are actually achieving. Enormous discrepancies become apparent in the report. Even if the countries were to achieve all the climate change goals they have committed themselves to so far, global warming would still exceed 3 degrees Celsius by 2100, according to the report. This would cause a sea level rise of half a meter (1'8"), meaning cities like Miami or Shanghai might have to be abandoned. In order to achieve the 1.5-degree target, though, the countries of the world would have to multiply their efforts -- and ensure that they emit 32 billion tons less CO2 by 2030. The UNEP report states that even just 2-degree target would require a rapid reduction of total CO2 emissions by around 15 billion tons. It's not impossible, but it is extremely difficult. Researchers who worked on the UN report say achieving the 1.5 degree goal would require that each country reduce its CO2 emissions by 7.6 percent each year between 2020 and 2030. In order to achieve the 2-degree target, reductions of 2.7 percent per year are necessary. "We are nowhere near on track to meet the Paris Agreement target," said Petteri Taalas, secretary-general of the World Meteorological Organization, summing up the situation. Meanwhile, UNEP head Inger Anderson has said that "radical transformations" of economies and societies toward increased sustainability are now needed. Otherwise, she says, we will find ourselves facing a "planet radically altered by climate change." There is no third option. The UNEP report is critical of lack of action taken by countries around the world despite the promises they have made. When the first "Emissions Gap Report" was released in 2010, many countries promised to phase out subsidies for fossil fuels, but little has happened since then. Others promised to stop deforestation, but often enough, words weren't followed by deeds. The organization is now urging G-20 countries to adopt a series of tough measures. The EU should stop generating power from coal, for instance, and forget about installing gas pipelines from Russia. Europe should also abolish the combustion engine, make buildings more energy-efficient more quickly and massively expand local public transportation everywhere. The new head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced a "European Green Deal" on Wednesday, which the commission said would likely require investments of over 1 trillion euros in additional climate protection measures by 2030. The aim is for the entire Continent to become carbon-neutral by 2050, at least according to the official plan. The measures that will ultimately be taken to achieve this, however, will likely fall short of UNEP's demands. The tone of the UNEP report is largely pessimistic, but it does contain passages that leave some room for optimism. The cost of producing renewable energy has fallen much faster than experts thought possible just a few years ago. The price of solar energy, for instance, has dropped by more than 75 percent since 2010, while the price of wind power has gone down by around 35 percent. In many parts of the world, renewables are already the cheapest source of energy. A surprising number of coal-fired power plants are therefore being shut down sooner than expected, or are simply not built in the first place. The report's authors see enormous -- and realistic -- potential for reducing CO2 by 2030 in the areas of green power generation, reforestation, electromobility and more energy-efficient industry. So, has the era of renewable energies finally dawned? Not entirely. Tipping Points UNEP and its partners, including the Stockholm Environment Institute, have published another report. This one examines just how many fossil fuels will be extracted from the earth in the foreseeable future on the basis of decisions that have already been made, investment commitments or permits that have been granted. The result: Unless governments intervene on a massive scale, the amount of oil, coal and gas being extracted and burned will be 50 percent more than otherwise permitted under the 2 degrees Celsius target, and more than twice as much as the 1.5 degrees Celsius target. At the moment, the global mean temperature is rising by 0.2 degrees Celsius per decade. From this, barring some radical about-face, it can be surmised that the earth will already be 1.5 degrees hotter in 2040 than in the pre-industrial era -- 60 years sooner than predicted by the Paris Climate Agreement. Prospects like these make some climate researchers nervous, because as global temperatures rise, so does the risk that so-called tipping points in the climate system will be reached. If these thresholds are exceeded, self-reinforcing and perhaps irreversible processes could occur that might lead to even more warming. A Stalled Gulf Stream This is already happening with sea ice in the Arctic. Because it's so bright, it reflects massive amounts of solar energy back into space. But if the ice melts due to global warming, like it is already doing in the summer months, that solar energy gets absorbed by the sea, which then heats up and melts even more ice. A warmer Arctic also results in more permafrost thawing, which allows huge amounts of methane, a particularly potent greenhouse gas, to escape into the atmosphere. In turn, the temperature rises even further and more ice melts on, say, Greenland. This fresh water then pours into the Atlantic, which could cause sea levels around the world to rise and could also alter the Gulf Stream, the strong ocean current that warms Western and Northern Europe. The Gulf Stream is primarily driven by the thick, heavy salt water that sinks along Greenland's coast. If this water is diluted by enough fresh water, the current could weaken, which would disrupt ocean circulation worldwide. In the scientific journal Nature, researchers from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) and other organizations have now expressly warned against these and other tipping points. It is conceivable that some of these could trigger others like dominoes; if a critical mass is reached, the earth's composition could be changed quite abruptly. Our planet is already considerably warmer and it could be "dangerously close" to these tipping points. This possibility, though theoretical, constitutes "a planetary emergency" and "an existential threat to civilization," PIK founder Hans Joachim Schellnhuber and his colleagues write. Does this count as alarmism? Absolutely. Other climate researchers have their doubts as to whether these tipping points are really that imminent. But what if they are?

#### Even if some warming is inevitable, stopping tail-end risk prevents extinction

Roberts 8-7-2018 (David, “This graphic explains why 2 degrees of global warming will be way worse than 1.5,” *Vox*, <https://www.vox.com/platform/amp/energy-and-environment/2018/1/19/16908402/global-warming-2-degrees-climate-change?__twitter_impression=true>)

By delaying the necessary work of decarbonization, we are consigning millions of people in tropical regions to less food and in the Mediterranean to less water — with all the attendant health problems and conflict. We’re allowing more heat waves and higher seas. We’re giving up on the world’s coral reefs, and with them the hundreds of species that rely on them. And even then, the decision will still face us: 2 degrees or 3? Again, it will mean more heat waves, more crop losses, more water shortages, more inundated coastal cities, more disease and conflict, millions more suffering. And even then, the decision: 3 degrees or 4? The longer we wait, the more human suffering and irreversible damage to ecosystems we inscribe into our collective future. But there’s no hiding, no escaping the imperative to decarbonize. It must be done if our species is to have a long-term home on Earth.

#### CCS fails.

Kubota ‘19 (Taylor Kubota; Citing Mark Z. Jacobson, professor of civil and environmental engineering @ Stanford AND senior fellow at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment; 10/25/19; "Study casts doubt on carbon capture"; *Phys*; <https://phys.org/news/2019-10-carbon-capture.html>) \*Upstream emissions = emissions, including from leaks and combustion, from mining and transporting a fuel such as coal or natural gas

One proposed method for reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) levels in the atmosphere—and reducing the risk of climate change—is to capture carbon from the air or prevent it from getting there in the first place. However, research from Mark Z. Jacobson at Stanford University, published in Energy and Environmental Science, suggests that carbon capture technologies can cause more harm than good. "All sorts of scenarios have been developed under the assumption that carbon capture actually reduces substantial amounts of carbon. However, this research finds that it reduces only a small fraction of carbon emissions, and it usually increases air pollution," said Jacobson, who is a professor of civil and environmental engineering. "Even if you have 100 percent capture from the capture equipment, it is still worse, from a social cost perspective, than replacing a coal or gas plant with a wind farm because carbon capture never reduces air pollution and always has a capture equipment cost. Wind replacing fossil fuels always reduces air pollution and never has a capture equipment cost." Jacobson, who is also a senior fellow at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, examined public data from a coal with carbon capture electric power plant and a plant that removes carbon from the air directly. In both cases, electricity to run the carbon capture came from natural gas. He calculated the net CO2 reduction and total cost of the carbon capture process in each case, accounting for the electricity needed to run the carbon capture equipment, the combustion and upstream emissions resulting from that electricity, and, in the case of the coal plant, its upstream emissions. (Upstream emissions are emissions, including from leaks and combustion, from mining and transporting a fuel such as coal or natural gas.) Common estimates of carbon capture technologies—which only look at the carbon captured from energy production at a fossil fuel plant itself and not upstream emissions—say carbon capture can remediate 85-90 percent of carbon emissions. Once Jacobson calculated all the emissions associated with these plants that could contribute to global warming, he converted them to the equivalent amount of carbon dioxide in order to compare his data with the standard estimate. He found that in both cases the equipment captured the equivalent of only 10-11 percent of the emissions they produced, averaged over 20 years. This research also looked at the social cost of carbon capture—including air pollution, potential health problems, economic costs and overall contributions to climate change—and concluded that those are always similar to or higher than operating a fossil fuel plant without carbon capture and higher than not capturing carbon from the air at all. Even when the capture equipment is powered by renewable electricity, Jacobson concluded that it is always better to use the renewable electricity instead to replace coal or natural gas electricity or to do nothing, from a social cost perspective. Given this analysis, Jacobson argued that the best solution is to instead focus on renewable options, such as wind or solar, replacing fossil fuels. Efficiency and upstream emissions This research is based on data from two real carbon capture plants, which both run on natural gas. The first is a coal plant with carbon capture equipment. The second plant is not attached to any energy-producing counterpart. Instead, it pulls existing carbon dioxide from the air using a chemical process. Jacobson examined several scenarios to determine the actual and possible efficiencies of these two kinds of plants, including what would happen if the carbon capture technologies were run with renewable electricity rather than natural gas, and if the same amount of renewable electricity required to run the equipment were instead used to replace coal plant electricity. While the standard estimate for the efficiency of carbon capture technologies is 85-90 percent, neither of these plants met that expectation. Even without accounting for upstream emissions, the equipment associated with the coal plant was only 55.4 percent efficient over 6 months, on average. With the upstream emissions included, Jacobson found that, on average over 20 years, the equipment captured only 10-11 percent of the total carbon dioxide equivalent emissions that it and the coal plant contributed. The air capture plant was also only 10-11 percent efficient, on average over 20 years, once Jacobson took into consideration its upstream emissions and the uncaptured and upstream emissions that came from operating the plant on natural gas. Due to the high energy needs of carbon capture equipment, Jacobson concluded that the social cost of coal with carbon capture powered by natural gas was about 24 percent higher, over 20 years, than the coal without carbon capture. If the natural gas at that same plant were replaced with wind power, the social cost would still exceed that of doing nothing. Only when wind replaced coal itself did social costs decrease. For both types of plants this suggests that, even if carbon capture equipment is able to capture 100 percent of the carbon it is designed to offset, the cost of manufacturing and running the equipment plus the cost of the air pollution it continues to allow or increases makes it less efficient than using those same resources to create renewable energy plants replacing coal or gas directly. "Not only does carbon capture hardly work at existing plants, but there's no way it can actually improve to be better than replacing coal or gas with wind or solar directly," said Jacobson. "The latter will always be better, no matter what, in terms of the social cost. You can't just ignore health costs or climate costs." This study did not consider what happens to carbon dioxide after it is captured but Jacobson suggests that most applications today, which are for industrial use, result in additional leakage of carbon dioxide back into the air. Focusing on renewables People propose that carbon capture could be useful in the future, even after we have stopped burning fossil fuels, to lower atmospheric carbon levels. Even assuming these technologies run on renewables, Jacobson maintains that the smarter investment is in options that are currently disconnected from the fossil fuel industry, such as reforestation—a natural version of air capture—and other forms of climate change solutions focused on eliminating other sources of emissions and pollution. These include reducing biomass burning, and reducing halogen, nitrous oxide and methane emissions. "There is a lot of reliance on carbon capture in theoretical modeling, and by focusing on that as even a possibility, that diverts resources away from real solutions," said Jacobson. "It gives people hope that you can keep fossil fuel power plants alive. It delays action. In fact, carbon capture and direct air capture are always opportunity costs."

### 2AC [8]---AT Extinction First/Util

#### “Extinction first” relegates the Global South to collateral damage AND papers over root causes which turns the case

Santos 3, Professor of Sociology at the University of Coimbra (Boaventura de Souza Santos, 2003, “Collective Suicide?”, Bad Subjects, Issue # 63, <http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php>)

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage" , to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

### 2NC---Link/Turns Case/Alt Solves---Magna Carta

#### Controls the case. Cap’s the root cause, alt solves AND is mutually exclusive.

Winant 20, assistant professor of history at the University of Chicago. (Gabriel Winant, 1-21-2020, "Is Anti-Monopolism Enough?", *The Nation*, <https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/goliath-monopoly-and-democracy-matt-stoller-review/)---language> edited

It is clear from the outset of Goliath that Stoller very evidently wishes for a more just and equal world, and many of his solutions—breaking up and regulating the big banks and tech companies, for example—would be far preferable to the status quo. But he does not explain any of the reasons an anti-monopoly politics might win or achieve any staying power. If all of American history is defined by the struggle between the great heroes of anti-monopoly democracy and the avarice of Mellonism, then why would powerful and greedy [people] men not machinate once more against antitrust laws? Why wouldn’t disdainful intellectuals conspire against the people’s cause yet again? If the prevalence of monopoly, as Stoller insists, bears no relation to the larger social and economic environment and is purely a voluntary choice, then there’s no reason to believe that anti-monopoly can produce a stable resolution to the problem of corporate power. From where might antitrust politics draw social and political power with a mass base of farmers, craftsmen, and small businessmen long gone? What might bind the people as a whole together to confront their overlords? By way of employment in some cases, low prices or convenience in others, the monopolies that he detests have sunk their roots into large sections of society. Come after Amazon, and you come after its tens of millions of users too.

The socialism that Stoller dismisses emerged precisely in answer to these problems. It contends that capitalism gives rise—not once but repeatedly—to a potentially coherent and antagonistic social force capable of collective action. This is the working class. Because capitalism produces a larger population over time that cannot survive from its own property and therefore joins many of these people at sites of collective labor, it makes it possible for them to organize and then to exercise leverage and political leadership over other sectors of society. (This is the reason that the most exciting intellectual work in antitrust is being done by scholars who work on market power specifically in employment, such as Sanjukta Paul, Suresh Naidu, and Marshall Steinbaum.) One may criticize the socialist’s faith in the working class as politically naive or empirically inaccurate. But in any case, socialism (and beneath it Marxism as well) contains a theory of politics—a definite account of friends and enemies and why each is what it is—whereas Stoller’s populism does not. This is why socialists have proved to be so much less prone to deviations into jingoism and conspiracy theory than their populist peers.

One might also add that socialism and anti-monopoly are not necessarily opposed; In recent history, as well in the New Deal era, the two have blended in a combined opposition to the current economic and political order. For both sides, this blending together has been both opportunistic and fruitful. The presence in the presidential race of candidates who approximately represent each ideology illustrates the dynamic of this marriage of convenience. The socialist who speaks of class war allows the anti-monopolist to leverage her plans for fixing it into popularity; in turn, the plan maker must mimic the socialist’s positions in order for her gambit to succeed, thus validating his ideas. Each gets to obfuscate usefully through the presence of the other and because they share enemies: Wall Street and its political representatives.

But Stoller’s book also demonstrates some of the underlying differences. Anti-monopolists oppose the economic elite but not the social system that gave rise to it. Likewise, between socialism and anti-monopoly lies a vast difference in analysis about the nature of the state and, indeed, power itself. For the anti-monopolist, the state is a shield for the people against their plutocratic enemies; power inheres in the state, and it is only a question of whether the people capture it through elections. The anti-monopolist agenda is therefore to put the good expert into office, where she may wield the regulatory power of the state for the common good. For the socialist, on the other hand, the state is not neutral. Its purpose and nature are to serve the interests of the ruling class. If it can be remade to serve the working class, this project cannot be achieved without enormous social conflict, and this change can come only from below, not just through elections but through sustained attacks on authority at every level: in workplaces, schools, families, neighborhoods, and beyond. Friendly elements within the state may lend important support to such struggles, and this is one of the reasons socialists seek state power. But socialism cannot be achieved solely by means of such power.

Which of these analyses you believe (and which diagnosis you accept) is, in part, the result of the different historical narratives that we tell. If you think the problem we face is something like “crony capitalism” or “money in politics,” then there is one weird trick that will fix it: reining in the too-powerful corporations—often by using laws already on the books—in order to get back to the people’s business. This program, often presented as structural change, nonetheless represents an explicitly superficial approach: the idea that our economy has acquired a predatory, parasitic stratum at its top that needs to be stripped off, allowing the underlying system to work as intended. Explicitly or not, it’s the promise of a return to a lost utopia of markets, a society without fundamental antagonisms. If, on the other hand, you think our problems are deeper, woven more fundamentally into the structure of how we live together—which things and people we value and which we discard, who must wear the saddle and who gets to ride—then there’s no going back. If the problem lies with capitalism as a system and not specific malicious capitalists, then we’ve got to embark on an adventure of a different kind, one that leads us not back to the comforts of midcentury America but somewhere wild and new. Goliath will not help us find the way.

# 1NR

## KRITIK

### 1NR---AT Buch-Hansen

#### Their card agrees degrowth solves

Hubert Buch-Hansen 18. Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School. 04/2018. “The Prerequisites for a Degrowth Paradigm Shift: Insights from Critical Political Economy.” Ecological Economics, vol. 146, pp. 157–163.

3. Crisis Whereas previously in history, the tendency was for major crises to occur roughly one at a time, several deep and intertwined crises are currently unfolding in parallel (Max-Neef, 2014). The 2008 financial crisis may be over, but the economic and social scars it left continue to be deep, and a new financial crisis is already looming. The IMF speaks of a global recovery that is ‘weak and precarious’ and of the risk of ‘stagnation in advanced economies’ (IMF, 2016a: xiv, xvi). The fragility of the global financial system is underscored in a recent study, in which it is noted that global debt levels are now at an all-time high and that high private debt in the rich countries and in a few ‘systemically important emerging market economies […] increases the likelihood of a financial crisis’ (IMF, 2016b: 1). Contemporary capitalism is also characterized by a social crisis, which is related to growing inequality. The income gaps between the top earners (“the 1%” and “the 0.1%”) and the rest of society have become a hotly debated topic in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis as manifested in the emergence of the international Occupy movement and the publication of Thomas Piketty's bestseller Capital in the TwentyFirst Century (Piketty, 2014). While the top earners continue to rapidly accumulate more wealth, a large group of bottom earners – in many rich countries, this group accounts for up to 40% of the population – have scarcely benefitted from economic growth and are being left behind (OECD, 2015a). Economic inequality has profound social consequences; for instance, it reduces educational opportunities and lowers the social mobility of many people at the bottom. As the OECD (2015a: 21) comments, ‘the decline of the 40% raises social and political questions. When such a large group in the population gains so little from economic growth, the social fabric frays and trust in institutions is weakened.’ Income inequality has also increased in many developing countries, and although the number of people living in extreme poverty has been reduced significantly in recent decades (OECD, 2015b: 36), hundreds of millions of people still live in poverty. Another crisis is the environmental crisis, which encompasses a wide range of factors – including, for instance, climate change, biodiversity loss and deforestation – that undermine current and future living conditions for human beings and other species (Speth, 2008). The root cause of this crisis is the endless increase in the world's volume of production and in humanity's consumption of the planet's finite resources. To merely sustain humanity's current level of environmental impact, 1.6 planets would be required (WWF, 2016). This figure obviously obscures the fact that whereas there is massive overconsumption in the rich countries of the world, the populations of a number of underdeveloped countries have a real and pressing need to increase their consumption if they are to meet basic human needs. A host of other actual or impending crises can be mentioned (see, e.g., Brand and Wissen, 2012; Harvey, 2010; Robinson, 2014). In fact, it is likely to be the case that ‘never before in human history have so many crises converged simultaneously to reach their maximum level of tension’ (Max-Neef, 2014: 17). It seems highly unlikely that these crises – which can also be thought of as one multidimensional crisis – could be resolved under the institutional arrangements of neoliberal capitalism. The 2008 financial crisis was – to no small extent – a result of neoliberal policies (Duménil and Lévy, 2011), and the same can be said of growing inequality (Hall et al., 2013). However, even more fundamentally, the question is whether the crises – not least the environmental crisis – can be resolved simultaneously within the framework of an economic system that needs to grow. So far, there is nothing to suggest that it is even remotely possible to bring humanity's environmental impact down to a sustainable level within such a system (Dietz and O'Neill, 2013; Jackson, 2009). To recapitulate, if a deep crisis is an important prerequisite for deep institutional change – as not only critical political economists but also many other social scientists suggest – then we live in a time when such change ought to be possible. In other words, the first precondition for a degrowth paradigm shift exists.

### 1NR---AT Roberts

#### Movements solve, but scaling up and out is key.

Giroux 15, McMaster University Chair for Scholarship in the Public Interest & The Paulo Freire Distinguished Scholar in Critical Pedagogy (Henry, March 3rd, “Higher Education and the Promise of Insurgent Public Memory,” *Truthout*, <https://truthout.org/articles/higher-education-and-the-promise-of-insurgent-public-memory/>, Accessed 1-20-2022)

The current historical moment calls for a politics that is transnational in its scope, global in its sense of responsibility and capable of creating new democratic public spheres in which it becomes possible to show private troubles can be connected to larger social issues, and public connections and modes of solidarity can be sustained beyond the private sphere. Only then will the promise and possibility of creating a radical global commons in the service of a radical democracy come into view. (42)

History is open, and the times are rife with unrest accompanied by new levels of state terrorism, all of which call for new ways to subvert the theater of cruelty and class consolidation that has the globe in the stranglehold of a death wish. Neoliberalism in its many punitive forms has exhausted its credibility and now threatens the entirety of human life and the planet itself. Hope is in the air but it won’t succeed in creating the promise of a new democratic future unless it first recognizes and grapples with the depth of the US nightmare. It is time for new visions, a new collective radical imagination, new tactics, new political formations and sustained, organized, international struggles. It is time to march into a future that will not mimic the dark authoritarianism haunting the present.

## ADV: TRADE

### 1NR---!D---Trade

#### Interdependence can just as easily cause war.

* Higher op costs of war cause uncertainty over resolve which raises risk of war
* Need to disaggregate effects of trade
* Effect remains for nuclear countries

Spaniel and Malone 3/5/19 [William Spaniel, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh. Iris Malone, Department of Political Science, Stanford. The Uncertainty Tradeoff: Re-Examining Opportunity Costs and War. March 5, 2019. <https://wjspaniel.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/uncertainty-tradeoff-final.pdf>]

This paper’s main contribution is to identify the precise conditions under which the probability of war increases despite rising opportunity costs. We show that, unlike other mechanisms, rising opportunity costs may counter-intuitively make war more likely because it also increases the difference between reservation points for unresolved versus resolved opponents. As a result, these informational asymmetries can lead states to screen their opponents and risk war. This new finding reshapes our understanding about the relationship between opportunity costs and war. It introduces a more nu-anced mechanism about when and how this relationship operates, sometimes contrary to expectations.

Our work advances economic interdependence theories of war in several ways. First, it provides new insight on the causes of war at odds with traditional cases where opportunity costs increased, yet conflict still erupted. Second, it demonstrates how and when competing effects of economic instruments predominate, driving changes in the probability of conflict. In contrast to previous work, we identify specific conditions under which increasing opportunity costs shifts the probability of conflict, consistent with the empirical evidence. Finally, it demonstrates the important, but subtle, effects of changing instruments, like trade flows, in the presence of uncertainty. The model advances a growing line of research that various sources of uncertainty have disparate effects on crisis bargaining.

This paper has more general implications for trade-conflict research. It complements growing calls to disaggregate the effects of instruments like trade (Martin et al. 2008). Empirical analyses must carefully trace what precisely parties do not know about each other to draw the correct inference. It also suggests states should be careful in interpreting how other states value or benefit from mutual trade flows. A free trade agreement championed by one state may be perceived as relatively less beneficial in another state. This uncertainty may undermine the credibility to abide by the agreement in the long-run.

We also highlight the need for future research to consider screening incentives in trade deals themselves. Although the proposer benefits from greater trade—both from the direct economic benefit and indirect ability to steal more surplus from the receiver— trade can harm unresolved receivers and incentivize screening. This could generate some constraints in the deals a state is willing to sign, in fear that the rearranged incentives under uncertainty could hurt its ability to effectively bluff later. A more unified approach to trade and crisis negotiations would yield additional interesting insights.

Moving forward, the results speak to other lines of research in international relations theory predicated on changing costs of conflict. We couched our results in the interdependence literature due its clear application. However, the comparative static speaks to cases where the receiver’s costs increase more generally.23 Framed this way, the results have clear implications for other literatures. For example, standard nuclear deterrence theory argues that possessing nuclear weapons increases the costs of war for potential challengers due to the risk of a retaliatory nuclear response (Morgenthau 1961, 280; Gilpin 1983, 213-219). The logic of alliance formation similarly relics on the assumption that entering these pacts induces peace by raising an opponent’s costs of conflict (Morrow 1994). Together, these mechanisms assume raising the costs of war should decrease conflict. Our results demonstrate this effect is likely more conditional than previously realized. We find increased costs of conflict can exacerbate issues with uncertainty over resolve even if both states possess destructive weaponry. This promises to shed new insights into how raising costs affects deterrence and coercive bargaining in other contexts.

#### Empirics prove.

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How does interdependence affect war, the most intense form of conflict? Table 2 gives the empirical results. The rarity of wars makes any analysis of their causes quite difficult, for variations in interdependence will seldom result in the occurrence of war. As in the case of MIDs, the log-likelihood ratio tests for each model suggest that the inclusion of the various measures of interdependence and the control variables improves our understanding of the factors affecting the occurrence of war over that obtained from the null model. However, the individual interdependence variables, alone, are not statistically significant. This is not the case with contiguity and relative capabilities, which are both statistically significant. Again, we see that contiguous dyads are more conflict-prone and that dyads composed of states with unequal power are more pacific than those with highly equal power. Surprisingly, no evidence is provided to support the commonly held proposition that democratic states are less likely to engage in wars with other democratic states. The evidence from the pre-WWII period provides support for those arguing that economic factors have little, if any, influence on affecting leaders’ decisions to engage in war, but many of the control variables are also statistically insignificant. These results should be interpreted with caution, since the sample does not contain a sufficient number wars to allow us to capture great variations across different types of relationships. Many observations of war are excluded from the sample by virtue of not having the corresponding explanatory measures. A variable would have to have an extremely strong influence on conflict—as does contiguity—to find significant results. 7. Conclusions This study provides little empirical support for the liberal proposition that trade provides a path to interstate peace. Even after controlling for the influence of contiguity, joint democracy, alliance ties, and relative capabilities, the evidence suggests that in most instances trade fails to deter conflict. Instead, extensive economic interdependence increases the likelihood that dyads engage in militarized dispute; however, it appears to have little influence on the incidence of war.

## ADV: Resources

### 1NR---Renewables

#### Renewables increase warming---rebound effect overwhelms efficiency gains.

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5. Efficiency and the Rebound Effect

The poor historical record of decoupling reviewed above is counter-intuitive, perhaps, because one might ordinarily think that efficiency gains would lead to substantial reductions in energy and resource demands. In other words, it is plausible to think that as the world gets better at producing commodities more efficiently, the absolute impacts of our economic activity would naturally decline. But we have seen that this assumption has not played out in reality. In part this is due to sheer growth in economic throughput and energy services, which has overwhelmed the efficiency gains that have been made. But another critical part of the explanation is due to what are known as ‘rebound effects’ (Alcott, 2005; Polimeni et al, 2009; Saunders, 2013). A rebound effect is said to have occurred when the benefits of efficiency improvements are partially or wholly negated by consumption growth – either by consumers or by industry – that was made possible by the efficiency improvements (Herring and Sorrell, 2009; Alcott and Madlener, 2009). For example, a 5% increase in energy efficiency may only reduce energy consumption by 2% if the efficiency improvements incentivise consumers or industry to increase demand for energy (meaning 60% of anticipated savings are lost or ‘taken back’). In other words, efficiency improvements can provoke behavioural or economic responses (‘rebounds’) that end up reducing some of the anticipated benefits of the efficiency improvements. When those rebounds are significant enough they can even lead to increased resource or energy consumption, which is sometimes called ‘back-fire’ or the ‘Jevons paradox,’ in reference to the classical economist William Stanley Jevons who first observed the phenomena. There are two main categories of rebound effects – direct rebounds and indirect rebound.

A direct rebound occurs when an efficiency gain in production results in increased consumption of the same resource (Khazzoom, 1980; Frondel et al., 2012). For example, a more fuel-efficient car can lead people to drive more often, or drive further, since the costs of fuel per kilometre have gone down; a more efficient heater can lead people to warm their houses for longer periods or to hotter temperatures, since the relative costs of heating have gone down; energy efficient lighting can lead people to leave the lights on for longer, etc. (Sorrell, 2009). Similar dynamics operate in industry whereby the introduction of more energy efficiency methods either reduces the price of a commodity (since it makes production less resource-intensive or time-intensive), or else enables the development of new product lines, thus acting to incentivise higher consumption, meaning that some or all the efficiency gains are lost.

An indirect rebound occurs when efficiency gains lead to increased consumption of some other resource. For example, insulating one’s home might reduce the annual consumption of energy for electricity, but the money saved from reduced energy costs is often spent on other commodities that require energy (e.g., a plane flight or a new computer). This can mean that some, or all the energy saved from insulating one’s house is consumed elsewhere, meaning overall energy dependence can stay the same or even increase.

While the basic mechanism of rebound effects is widely acknowledged, and, indeed, beyond dispute, there is an ongoing debate over the magnitude of the various rebound phenomena (Chakravarty et al., 2013). There is, however, a strong body of literature arguing that the rebound effect is larger than has been previously assumed (Sorrell, 2015; Sanders, 2013). Saunders (2013), for example, finds that there was an average direct energy rebound (thus excluding potential indirect rebound) of 62% across 30 sectors of U.S industry from 1980 to 2000. Without entering further into the intricacies of the complex empirical and theoretical debates, it is fair to say that despite the uncertainties, there is broad agreement that rebound effects exist and that they are significant. The benefits of technology are almost always less than presumed, and, in fact, at times efficiency improvements can lead to more, not fewer, resources being consumed overall.

6. The ‘Growth Model’ Has No Techno-Fix

The forgoing lines of argument should be enough to cast doubt on the faith of the techno-optimists. But faith dies hard, even in the face of compelling evidence. Thus, the techno-optimist is likely to double down and proclaim that past behaviour is not a reliable guide to future success. As Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2011) argue: ‘The solution to the unintended consequences of modernity is, and has always been, more modernity – just as the solution to the unintended consequences of our technologies has always been more technology.’ While this can be accepted as a theoretical possibility, there are dynamics at play – including the laws of physics – that suggest that decoupling through efficiency gains will not reduce the overall ecological impacts of economic activity if global growth remains the primary economic goal (Ward et al, 2016).

This uncomfortable reality was highlighted by a recent study (Ward et al, 2016), which extrapolated out the implication of Australia pursuing economic growth at the modest rate (by historical standards) of 2.41% per annum each year until the end of the 21st century. The study assumed rapid technological development and proactive policy settings (i.e. a steeply rising global carbon price), resulting in historically unprecedented energy and resource efficiency gains. Nevertheless, given that by 2100 the Australian economy would have undergone an eightfold expansion, the study found that by 2100 Australian material and energy use, instead of declining, would have risen by 29 per cent and 256 per cent respectively on current levels (Ward et al; 9). The authors conclude that this demonstrates ‘categorically that GDP growth cannot be sustained indefinitely’ (Ward et al 2016; 10).

Even this scenario, however, understates the true magnitude of the challenge for those advocating techno-optimism. First, these scenarios assume that efficiency gains will be just as easy to achieve in coming decades as they have in the past. But this assumption is highly questionable, given the reality of diminishing returns from investment, which we are already witnessing today, and which are likely to accelerate as ecological conditions deteriorate. This is most obvious with respect to the resource sector, which includes, of course, fossil fuels accounting for over 80 per cent of the global economy’s primary energy (IEA, 2017). For basic economic reasons, humans tend to extract the cheapest and easiest resources first while leaving the more difficult, dangerous and expensive resources for later. What this means is that, over coming decades, the energy and financial costs of resource extraction will tend to rise. Indeed, this trend is already apparent; several decades ago, for example, the energy in one barrel of oil could be used to extract 30 barrels of oil, but the ratio is now estimated to be around 18 and the ratio will only decrease in coming decades (Hall et al, 2014). The impact of depletion is also evident in the mining sector with declining mineral ore grades and increasing mining waste rock and tailings resulting in higher energy, water and emission costs for mining and ore separation (Mudd, 2009). The upshot is that, even if there are rapid efficiency gains in, say, manufacturing processes, in coming decades they are likely to be increasingly counteracted by efficiency declines in resource extraction. This situation evokes the challenge faced by the Red Queen in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, who must run faster and faster simply to stay in the same place (Likvern, 2012).

### 1NR---Defense---REMs

#### REM scarcity is self-correcting---exploration, recycling, and innovation.

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Such examples illustrate the processes of resource efficiency and substitution (processes that extend far beyond rare earths). Scarcity, real or perceived, drives price, attention, R&D, and imagination. It elicits mineral exploration: At the market’s 2011 peak, some 190 companies were scouring the planet for potentially profitable rare-earth deposits. Scarcity makes end-uses more productive, durable, and closed-cycle, with recycling no longer an afterthought but a business imperative. It even drives the kind of basic research that in the United States (largely through the government agency ARPA-E) and in Japan has lately come up with even more powerful supermagnets based on iron nitride (Fe16N2) and containing no rare earths whatsoever. Sorry, China.

Remember when the 1973 and 1979 oil-price shocks triggered the development of mobility alternatives that are now coming to market and threatening to smother oil demand? The 2010-era rare-earth price spike set similarly subtle but irresistible forces in motion that will make sustained high rare-earth prices unsupportable.

Sloppy analysis. Together, these shifts in economic geology, resource use, and innovation are extremely powerful. This isn’t to say that no rare-earth issues remain: Price instability, for example, remains a long-term concern if greater efforts to supply the more-valuable “heavy” subfamily of rare earths co-produce too many less-valuable “light” ones. But serious concern about rare earths still lacks an informed basis in either scarcity or oligopoly. Only the echoes of less-informed prior concerns reverberate.